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ABSTRACT 
Innovation driven entrepreneurial firms have an important role in 
contributing to job creation, generating technological innovation, and 
stimulating the United States economy. However, there is recently a notable 
decline in emerging growth entrepreneurial activity in the United States. 
The Coalition Model proposes ways to maximize opportunities for industry, 
academia, and government to collaborate and build sustainable 
relationships, to help convert the current challenges in the U.S. market into 
opportunities.  
Designing a new innovation strategy will lead the United States in 
generating innovation, technology, and economic growth, as well as help 
the federal government harness new approaches for institutional change. 
Adopting the Coalition Model (the Model) will not only bridge some of the 
financial inefficiencies and information gaps associated with investment in 
innovation driven enterprises, but, perhaps more importantly, will serve as 
a catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the development of new firms 
and technologies.  
The Model is built on the notion of taking a proactive approach to 
innovation.  The model encourages government agencies to fund research 
and innovation, by identifying specific technological challenges, 
determining the course of the research that can benefit their needs, 
collaborating with audiences in the public sector, research institutions, and 
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universities, and private corporations to act on these needs, and advancing 
commercialization efforts. There are several potential benefits to adopting 
such a proactive policy. First, it might encourage future engineers, 
scientists, and innovators to take a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second, 
it provides direct funding to research and development needs that might not 
otherwise be used. Third, it can signal that there are opportunities for 
private investors to invest in such ventures, and perhaps even serve as some 
sort of certification. Fourth, it will create a direct pathway for small firms 
to access government procurement. Fifth, it will encourage knowledge 
spillovers between professionals in government, industry, and academia. 
Finally, it will increase awareness and incentives for private industry and 
academia to collaborate with the government.  
The Model advocates for the Administration to adopt a targeted policy 
initiative (strategic development tool): the Matchmaker. The Matchmaker 
is a private-public equity investment fund that will invest in early-stage 
firms, while also addressing the commercial strategic development needs 
articulated by the public funding partners—a governmental agency.  It will 
establish a channel for private firms to access government procurement and 
development. The initiative will function as an autonomous body, and be 
designed to prevent political capture. The adoption of the strategic 
Matchmaker fund will be to complement, and not to replace, the private 
market efforts in financing emerging growth firms.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Innovation driven entrepreneurial firms1 have an important role in 
contributing to job creation, generating technological innovation, and 
stimulating the United States economy. However, there was recently a 
notable decline in emerging growth entrepreneurial activity in the United 
States.2 According to the 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
survey, the total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) in the United States declined 
from fourteen percent (14%) to twelve percent (12%).3 The survey advances 
the view that fewer Americans are taking steps to start new businesses.4 
There are several reasons for this phenomenon. 
Finding ways to maximize opportunities for industry, academia, and 
government to collaborate and build sustainable relationships will help 
convert the current challenges in the U.S. market into opportunities. 
Combining the resources of these sectors will lead to innovation-driven firm 
formation. This Article will advance the view that markets for allocating 
risk capital to early-stage ventures are inefficient and that the financing of 
these firms present countless underlying challenges to their prospective 
investors and innovators. There is a financing and information gap, which 
is termed the “Valley of Death.”5 The Valley of Death describes the 
 
 
* Jacobson Fellow in Law and Business, New York University School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova, Lynn A. Stout, John J. Barcelo’, Edward Beck, Avi Beck, and 
the late Theodore Eisenberg who will be sorely missed, for their insights.  It is dedicated to my children 
Elle and Michael.  
1 William Aulet & Fiona Murray, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding Differences in the 
Types of Entrepreneurship in the Economy 1, 2-5 (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740. According to Aulet and Murray there is 
a difference between innovation-driven enterprises and small medium size enterprises. (“Not all startup 
companies are created equal. Although both innovation-driven enterprises (IDEs) and traditional small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can provide valuable products and services and create jobs, IDEs 
– startups focused on addressing global markets based on technological, process or business model 
innovation – can potentially create hundreds or even thousands of high-skill jobs if they succeed.”) 
William Aulet & Fiona Murray, Abstract, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding Differences in 
the Types of Entrepreneurship in the Economy (May 1, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740). 
2 See DONNA KELLEY, ET AL., GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, 2015/16 GLOBAL REPORT 
112 (2015), http://www.gemconsortium.org/report/49480.  
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 20 (noting that “economies showing the lowest TEA rates . . . also show low established 
business ownership”). 
5 See GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., PHX. CTR. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD., A 
VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.osec.doc.gov/Report-Valley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf; see LEWIS 
BRANSCOMB & PHILLIP AUERSWALD, BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
FUNDING FOR EARLY- STAGE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 2002), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841.pdf; see also PHILLIP 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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financial barriers of firms at the early stage of technology development. 
Such difficulties are the product of the uncertainty, high risk and 
information asymmetry problems, which preclude many investors from 
backing such firms. Additionally, policymakers, practitioners and 
academics alike hold strong views that investors’ emphasis on stock market 
liquidity, which is evidenced by the growing high frequency and 
algorithmic trading activity and short-term holding periods, encourages a 
focus on short-term results.6 The short-term focus of investors and corporate 
boards is currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance 
debate.7  
The newly elected United States Administration must devise an 
innovation strategy that will lead the world in generating innovation, 
technology, and economic growth, as well as help the federal government 
harness new approaches for institutional change. The notion that the United 
States is on the verge of losing its place as a world leader in generating 
 
 
AUERSWALD ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (SEPT. 2005), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841a.pdf; see also Ederyn 
Williams, Crossing the Valley of Death,  INGENIA (Dec. 30, 2004) 
http://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/284 (discussing valley of death in the UK); see also Philipp 
Marxgut, Innovation Policy in the US – an Interview with Charles Wessner, BRIDGES (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/volume-19-october-16-2008/item/3585-innovation-policy-in-
the-us-an-interview-with-charles-wessner (“There is great complacency in Washington about the US 
position in the world. There is relatively limited understanding in the policy community about the scale 
and scope of foreign investments in new technologies, including new institutions, such as ASTAR in 
Singapore or the large and apparently effective Chinese S&T Parks, or the highly successful 
Microelectronics center, called IMEC, in Flanders. Here in the US we do not need to do exactly what 
others are doing, but we do need to greatly strengthen the interaction between the government, the 
universities, and the private sector by providing a wide variety of incentives for cooperation on the new 
technologies that will be the basis of future industries”). 
6 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH] (According to Stout, the rise of shareholder primacy thinking began “in the 1970s with the rise 
of the so-called Chicago School of free-market economists. Prominent members of the School began to 
argue that economic analysis could reveal the proper goal of corporate quite clearly, and that goal was 
to make shareholders as wealthy as possible . . . the idea that corporate performance could be simply 
and easily measured through the single metric of share price . . . .”).  
7 For discussion on shareholder value, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE 
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); see also, Ira M. Millstein, Re-
examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/?_r=0 
(“[C]orporate boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they 
owe their fiduciary duties. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully 
management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in extra dividends 
or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:267 
 
 
 
 
innovation, technology, and economic growth, is not a new one.8  
Economists have been warning for quite some time, even prior to the current 
Administration, that the United States is facing a “historic tipping point,”9 
where countries around the world are “stepping on the gas”10 to promote 
innovation policies, while the United States is “slacking off,”11 lagging 
behind and even worse yet, scaling back on such important policies 
supporting growth efforts.12  
The Administration can mitigate some of these problems by intervening 
in the market in order to encourage the creation (and survival) of high-
growth firms. This Article proposes a “Coalition Model,” which promotes 
policies for innovation strategy in the form of public-private partnership 
initiatives. Adopting the Coalition Model bridges some of the financial 
inefficiencies and information gaps associated with investment in 
innovation-driven enterprises, but, perhaps, more importantly, will serve as 
a catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the development of new firms 
and technologies.  
The Model is built on the notion of taking a proactive approach to 
innovation.  The Model encourages government agencies to fund research 
and innovation, by identifying specific technological challenges, 
determining the course of the research that can benefit their needs, 
collaborating with audiences in the public sector, research institutions and 
universities, and private corporations to act on these needs, and advancing 
commercialization efforts.  
There are several potential benefits to adopting such a proactive policy. 
First, it might encourage future engineers, scientists and innovators to take 
a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second, it provides direct funding to 
research and development needs that might otherwise not be used. Third, it 
can signal that there are opportunities for private investors to invest in such 
ventures, and perhaps even serve as some sort of certification. Fourth, it will 
create a direct pathway for small firms to access government procurement.  
Fifth, it will encourage knowledge spillovers between professionals in 
 
 
8 See JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION EDGE, WHY IT 
MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 3 (2007).  
9 Id. (“In tomorrow’s world, even more than today’s innovation will be the engine of progress. So 
unless we move to rectify this dismal situation, the United States cannot hope to remain a leader.  What’s 
in stake is nothing less than the future prosperity and security of our nation”).  
10 Id.   
11 Id.   
12 Richard A. Mann et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up 
Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2004) (“A new business is started every eleven seconds in the 
United States. One in twelve Americans is currently engaged in trying to start a new business. Of the 
more than twenty-three million businesses in the United States, more than 98% are small businesses 
employing 100 employees or fewer. Most of these businesses are not long-term survivors: 24% of new 
businesses fail within two years while 63% fail within six years”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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government, industry, and academia. And finally, it will increase awareness 
in private industry and academia about the benefits of collaborating with the 
government.  
The Model advocates for the Administration to adopt a targeted policy 
initiative (strategic development tool): the Matchmaker fund 
(“Matchmaker”). The Matchmaker fund is a private-public partnership 
equity investment fund, in which one of the public partners is a government 
agency that will invest in early-stage firms. The government agency partner 
will invest in such early-stage firms that will serve the commercial strategic 
development to be articulated by the agency. The fund will establish a 
channel for private firms to access government procurement and 
development. The fund will function as an autonomous, non-bureaucratic 
body, and be designed to prevent political capture. The adoption of the 
strategic Matchmaker fund will be formed to complement, and not to 
replace, the private market efforts in financing emerging growth firms.  
The Model allows the government to make direct equity investments in 
start-up firms using government-owned venture capital funds 
(Matchmaker), while also encouraging various private intermediaries to 
participate in the financings of such projects. The initiatives are designed to 
ensure effectiveness and prevent political distortions based on the 
successful case studies of Silicon Valley and Israel.   
This article calls upon the government to craft policies for institutional 
innovation that will encourage experimentation and reduce bureaucracy in 
order to radically improve the performance of the Federal government by 
soliciting private sector and civil society collaborations. Technological 
innovation is the only reliable engine that can drive change and is the 
fundamental source of sustained productivity and growth, according to 
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow.13 However, there are many challenges 
associated with introducing technological change into an existing 
organization, especially for bureaucratic organizations such as the U.S. 
government.  In general, it is much easier for public or private management 
to develop and invest in new technologies, rather than  implement the new 
technology into operations and train their employees in how to use the new 
tools.14 If the current Administration intends to successfully compete in 
tomorrow’s market place, promote growth, as well as increase productivity 
 
 
13 Robert M. Solow, Prize Lecture: Growth Theory and After, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 8, 1987), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html.  
14 See Dorothy Leonard-Barton & William A. Kraus, Implementing New Technology, HARV. BUS. 
REV, Nov. 1985, https://hbr.org/1985/11/implementing-new-technology.  
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and expand the economic and social value,15 then they must charge their 
new policymakers with designing and instituting sweeping innovation 
policies that will embrace new approaches to management, technologies and 
operating methods.16 This article will accordingly promote the following 
policy recommendations.   
There is a public debate in the U.S. concerning the role of the 
government in relation to the market. The U.S. has a long history of conflict 
with regards to the national policy and political structure concerning the 
government’s development efforts.17 The conflict can be traced to the times 
of the beginning of the Republic,18 to the difference in philosophy between 
founding fathers Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.  According to 
legal scholar Hockett,19 Jefferson20 suggested that governments work best 
when they govern the least (favoring the non-interventionist government), 
 
 
15 See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism 
– and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. – Feb. 2011, at. 1, 5. 
16 Fred Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the 
United States, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 169 (2008); see also KENT HUGHES, BUILDING THE NEXT AMERICAN 
CENTURY: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (Woodrow Wilson Center Press 
2005); see also Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S. Innovation 
Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 130-31 (2011) (“We lack a deep, broad national understating of why 
promoting innovation should be a national priority. As a result, we fail to address innovation policies in 
a proactive, explicit, and effective way.” Dent further discussed the “Volcker Rule” of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and stated that “polices [sic] that affect the innovation sector are frequently adopted as part of 
broader packages that have nothing to do with innovation”); see Porter & Kramer, supra note 15 (“The 
concept of shared value . . . recognizes that societal needs, not just conventional economic needs, define 
markets. It also recognizes that social harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firms—
such as wasted energy or raw materials, costly accidents, and the need for remedial training to 
compensate for inadequacies in education. And addressing societal harms and constraints does not 
necessarily raise costs for firms, because they can innovate through using new technologies, operating 
methods, and management approaches—and as a result, increase their productivity and expand their 
markets. Shared value, then, is not about personal values. Nor is it about “sharing” the value already 
created by firms—a redistribution approach. Instead, it is about expanding the total pool of economic 
and social value”).  
17 Robert C. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints & 
Finance in an Authentic American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005-2006) 
[hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic]. 
18 See id.; see also Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of 
Manufactures, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-
0007 (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (presenting validations for the encouragement of domestic 
manufacturing and made explicit plans for government action).   
19 See Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 17 (According to Hockett, there are fundamental 
differences in economic philosophies of the founding fathers, as follows: Jefferson suggested that 
governments work best when they govern the least, while Hamilton advocated for a strong centralized 
government with powers to work for the common benefit of all).  
20 See id. (According to Hockett, Thomas Jefferson was a member of the Southern planter 
aristocracy and, as a result, was somewhat prejudiced towards the “yeoman republic.” Jefferson was 
suspicious of a central government and objected to the idea of heavy industry and over-crowded large 
cities, while aspiring to a civic republic comprised of small landowners, who contracted using common-
interest agreements via mutual discourse). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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while Hamilton21 advocated for a strong centralized government with 
powers to work for the common benefit of all (favoring the interventionist 
government).  
Other scholars, such as Block, claim that this tension was resolved 
fairly22 in the twentieth century when developmental policies were formed 
within the context of national defense.23 For the purposes of this article, the 
result of such integration is embedded in the grants and funds that were 
invested by the U.S. government in countless advanced technologies, such 
as jet planes, computers, lasers, civilian nuclear energy, and 
biotechnology.24 This article advances the view that for national defense 
purposes, the U.S. Government must intervene in the market in order to 
encourage entrepreneurship and innovation policy.   
There are several roles that government can take in order to intervene in 
the market. First, there is a “supervisory”25 view of the government, which 
differentiates between the government and the market, and separates 
between the public and private spheres.26 Government interventions, 
accordingly, are considered exogenous because the government is changing 
the ordinary way of things.27 
Second, there is a “constitutive” or “foundational” view, by which 
governments are “internal” to and even create the markets by developing 
the “rules of the game.”28  According to this view, the law is “foundational” 
to operating markets, and the market performance is actually enhanced 
 
 
21 See id. (According to Hockett, Hamilton envisioned a meritocratic republic, such as the one in 
which Hamilton himself had flourished and thrived in. The foundation for a national supremacy should 
be a strong, industrialized economy, where the nation can produce its own goods).  
22 It should be noted that politically, the debate is still ongoing in the U.S. with Republicans saying 
they want to do away with big government and Democrats wishing for big government. See Jeffersonian 
Republic, supra note 17.  
23 See Block, supra note 16, at 6; see Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 17 (Hockett further argues 
that the U.S. has advanced to integrate the ideals of both founders).  
24 See Block, supra note 16, at 6-7 (According to Block, following World War II, the Pentagon 
worked intimately and cooperated with other national security agencies such as the atomic Energy 
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), and such cooperation and 
funding had a key role in developing these technologies). 
25 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments 
as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 56-57 (2014) (“In this capacity, governments act 
much as private actors do in particular markets. They employ the same means toward their ends”) (the 
term was introduced by Hockett & Omarova).  
26 See id. at 54 (“Government is in this sense taken for “external” to markets, while “we,” the public 
—for unexplained reasons categorically distinguished from “our” government — are counted as 
“internal” to the practices of market exchange. Call this “supervisory,” or “deus ex machina” view of 
government in its relation to markets”).  
27 Id. (“Governments ‘step in’ from ‘outside’”).  
28 Id. at 55 (These rules “even define markets from the . . . ‘ground up’”). 
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when regulated by the law.29  
The third view, and the one that this article will advance, is one 
sustaining the government’s role as a “marker actor.”30 According to legal 
scholars Hockett and Omarova,  this view is often overlooked.31 When the 
government acts as a market participant, it does so “for public rather than 
private ends,” and in doing so, it defies the “venerable but misleading” 
separation between the private and public spheres.32 Our society perhaps 
allows the government to act as a market participant because the 
government is able to have more effect (influence) on the market than 
private parties.33  This article will illuminate the “market-acting role” of the 
US government.  The notion of the United States government acting as a 
catalyst or even a venture capitalist is not a novel one. Throughout United 
States history, the governments have played the role of venture capitalists 
at the State and local level and even at the federal level, suggesting that 
public intervention in the market is acceptable and perhaps even 
necessary.34 
The Coalition Model derives from the core concept of Solow that 
technological innovation is the only reliable engine that drives change and 
is a fundamental source for productivity and sustained economic growth.35 
The Coalition Model builds on Solow’s model and adds that government 
intervention is required because it is a powerful market actor36 and can 
 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 55-56 (“In this capacity, governments act much as private actors do in particular markets. 
They employ the same means toward their ends. They do so, however, for public rather than private 
ends, thereby defying, in limited ways, such venerable but misleading dichotomies as the ‘public/private’ 
divide”). 
31 Id.   
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 56 (“They do so, moreover, with greater influence than private parties are typically able—
or permitted—to bring to bear. And we permit our government this form of market power, in turn, 
precisely because it is public rather than private power—power wielded on behalf of and in the name of 
us all”). There are four recurring types of government participation (intervention) in private markets (for 
public ends), according to Hockett and Omarova. They are: “market-making” (means “government’s 
playing a particular risk-bearing role that private actors themselves sometimes but not always are able 
to play either (a) makes a publicly beneficial market possible, or (b) facilitates an incipient such market’s 
growth to critical mass”), “market-moving” (means “government action affects certain market prices in 
certain publicly beneficial ways that we cannot ordinarily trust profit-driven private actors to pursue”), 
“market-levering” (means “government action enables existing private markets to do better, or to do 
more of, what they already do in more limited or otherwise suboptimal manners”), and “market-
preserving” (means “government action- typically temporary and only in extremis – prevents complete 
liquidation or collapse of a normally well-functioning market whose collapse would impose negative 
externalities”). Id. at 56-57. 
34 See JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED –AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT viii 
(Princeton University Press 2009) [hereinafter BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS].  
35 See Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.  
36 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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alleviate the discussed current market inefficiencies. A detailed analysis of 
the Matchmaker initiative and the market inefficiency that it tries to mitigate 
is provided below. Society becomes a stakeholder in economic growth 
because it empowers the government to act on its behalf. As noted above, 
government intervention is not a new concept because the government takes 
risk-bearing roles that private actors are not always able (or willing) to take 
for one reason or another.37  
It also builds on the notion that the government needs to invest in 
knowledge, human capital, and innovation in order to encourage knowledge 
spillovers38 by encouraging the formation (and survival) of new 
entrepreneurial firms and stimulating growth.39  
Therefore, the United States government needs to intervene in the market 
in order to increase growth, entrepreneurship, and innovation.40 The 
Coalition Model is designed as a policy tool for government intervention 
that takes the form of the proposed public-private partnerships that allow 
for strategic planning to benefit society for future generations.   
In order to develop the coalition, the conventional community of 
stakeholders is expanded to include the private sector (entrepreneurial and 
established firms), management, academia and research community, 
industry and economic development organizations, federal, state, regional 
and local governments, the financial sector including investment banks, 
angel groups and venture capital groups, on top of the traditional 
stakeholder groups, which include: customers, employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and shareholders.  
The Coalition Model is designed as a public-private-partnership, which 
describes a relationship wherein private and public resources are combined 
to achieve goals that will benefit both parties. Public-private-partnerships 
have been used to contribute to public benefit in national economies since 
the beginning of recorded history.41 In the United States, technology clusters 
 
 
37 See id. 
38 See Audretsch, infra note 315, at 9-10 (discussing “knowledge spillover” and how “small firms 
account for a disproportional share of new product innovations given their low R&D expenditures”). 
39 BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.  
40 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25.   
41 Louis Witters et al., The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation, in THE 
GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX OF 2012, at 81 (Soumitra Dutta ed., WIPO 2012), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf (discussing the following examples 
of public-private-partnerships (PPPs):  
“[I]n the city-state of Athens in the 4th century BC, prominent citizens made major 
contributions in order to stage public festivals and religious events and to build public buildings 
and monuments. Some centuries later, when the Roman army conquered large parts of Europe 
and the Mediterranean region, civilians worked hand-in-hand with the army to exploit the new 
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in Silicon Valley and Route 128 emerged thanks to government intervention 
in the market (in the form of public-private-partnerships) as noted above. 
Moreover, much of the technological advancement, which revolutionized 
the market and our lives, such as the Internet,42 was made possible thanks 
to public-private-partnerships.  
Public-private-partnerships are defined as “contractual agreements 
between a public agency or public-sector authority and a private-sector 
entity that allow for greater private participation in the delivery of public 
services, or in developing an environment that improves the quality of life 
for the general public.”43  
The Coalition Model is a form of public-private-partnership that uses 
various methods of collaboration, which combine the government’s 
forward-thinking policies and the private sector’s innovative efforts, as well 
as the support from nonprofit organizations and private intermediaries. This 
article, therefore, promotes the view of the role of government as a market 
participant and calls for an intervention in the market for national security 
and economic reasons.   
The subsequent parts of this article examine the U.S. Government 
intervention in the market throughout history. Part II introduces the 
historical economic and legal evolution of the model, starting with the 
Declaration of Independence in Section (1), the period between 1865 and 
1920 in Section (2), and a discussion of the rise of the large, vertically 
integrated American corporation in Section (3). Section (3) also includes 
two important examples: (a) the story of the Advanced Projects Research 
Agency (ARPA), and (b) the successful outcome of the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Section (c) then describes the 
changes in the United States market from patterns of vertical corporate 
development (such as the example of corporations in Route 128) towards a 
 
 
territories and build needed infrastructure. PPPs have a long history in the United States of 
America (USA) as well: the principle that government and political leaders should use and 
support private businesses—in order to develop scientific advancement and innovations for the 
benefit of the society—was well established at the time the country’s constitution was written.  
One of the first instances of a PPP in the New World occurred in 1742 when Benjamin Franklin 
established the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, which— together with the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives—sponsored the founding of the University of 
Pennsylvania, the first medical school in the British colonies.  The purpose of this collaboration 
was to make advancements in agriculture, science, and medicine available to all citizens.  
Another, more recent, renowned project that brought the business world and government 
together in the public interest was the building of the Paris metro: the tunnels were constructed 
by the city, while the tracks, energy, signaling, and rolling stock were provided by the operator, 
a Belgian entrepreneur”). 
42 See Block, supra note 16, at 9.  
43 Witters et al., supra note 41, at 81 (“Under such a legal construction, the partners share risk, 
reward, and responsibility for a shared investment.  These partnerships are not simply tools for funding 
projects, but they require full commitment from all partners for the entire undertaking”).  
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network of organizations (such as Silicon Valley). Section (4) provides an 
overview of the Startup America initiative and additional federal 
initiatives led by the Obama Administration that were intended to promote 
innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth. Section (5) provides 
constructive criticism to previous government intervention in the market.   
 In Part III, the Matchmaker initiative component of the Coalition 
Model is emphasized. The Coalition Model is derived from Solow’s 
model.44 Solow introduced the notion that innovation stimulates growth.45 
This part explains the model and the choice of the public-private-partnership 
form, as well as introduces a proposal for a government Matchmaker 
venture capital fund initiative. The Matchmaker initiative is a targeted 
policy effort aimed at designing a platform for a competitive venture capital 
industry in the United States that promotes government venture capital 
investments in early-stage technology firms (start-ups) for national security 
purposes. Section (1) provides an overview of the role of the Venture 
Capital industry in the U.S. innovation process. Section (2) introduces the 
Matchmaker initiative, with an emphasis on the governance mechanisms. 
Part (a) introduces the fund’s “General Partner.” Sub-section (i) introduces 
the compensation structure, while giving examples of In-Q-Tel (the CIA VC 
fund). Sub-section (ii) introduces the incentives & safeguards. Sub-section 
(iii) discusses the required bidding process. Sub-section (iv) introduces the 
matching component and additional incentives to the “Upside.” Part (b) 
introduces the Limited Partners, especially the applicable U.S. government 
agency, in Sub-section (i). sub-section (ii) explains the mission and 
supervision. Sub-section (iii) introduces the user-friendly application 
process. Part (c) introduces the Private Investors.  
Part IV is an international comparison with Startup Nation’s (Israel) 
successful Yozma funds initiative. Section (1) introduces the “Yozma” 
funds initiative. Section (2) reviews the reasons for Israeli government 
intervention in the market. Section (3) provides a summary of Inbal, an 
Israeli government intervention that failed but led to the design of Yozma. 
Section (4) provides an overview of the successful Yozma design.  Section 
(5) compares Yozma with similar Silicon Valley initiatives.  
Part V addresses the criticism of whether the Matchmaker is designed to 
prevent potential abuse. Section (1) introduces the problem of inadequate 
monitoring of public management. Section (2) provides an overview for the 
 
 
44 Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956); 
see also Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. 
& STAT., Aug. 1957, at 312; see also Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.  
45 Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.  
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lack of market discipline of government-owned firms. Section (3) discusses 
illegal behavior and corruption of public managers. Section (4) discusses 
the issues of the political capture of business objectives.  
Part VI offers a summary of concluding thoughts about the Coalition 
Model and its applications. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS A MARKET 
PARTICIPANT 
A nation’s innovative system has a tendency to mirror its deliberate 
determination to maintain and expand its economic strength.46  This part 
provides a historic-doctrinal review of the processes that shaped the U.S. 
national innovation system, focusing on the role of the U.S. government as 
a “market actor.”47  
A. The Declaration of Independence 
In the course of gaining its independence, the United States government 
was able to establish institutional support, by which ingenuity could 
thrive.48  There were several factors that contributed to changes in the 
innovation market during the period of independence.  This Article will only 
address the following two.  First and foremost, the United States 
Constitution, which instituted far-reaching changes and guaranteed an 
internal joint market, allows residential United States entrepreneurial 
ventures to expand and supply the national market.49  
 
 
46 Scholars found that the national security concerns of the nations had been central in shaping their 
innovation systems; see RICHARD NELSON, NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 508 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); see also PETER DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 257 (Harper & Row 1985) (“There must be an economy full of innovators and 
entrepreneurs, with entrepreneurial vision and entrepreneurial values, with access to venture capital, and 
filled with entrepreneurial vigor”).  
47 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25 at 55-56. It should also be noted that President Obama’s 
administration took an interest in government-facilitated multi-stakeholder processes with regards to the 
Internet.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE 
INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK, at iii (2010), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf (“The United 
States has developed a model that facilitates transparency, promotes cooperation, and strengthens multi-
stakeholder governance that has allowed innovation to flourish while building trust and protecting a 
broad array of other rights and interests”); see also Symposium, The 11th Annual Digital Broadband 
Migration Symposium: The Dynamics of Disruptive Innovation, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 
(2012).  
48 Louis P. Cain, Entrepreneurship in the Antebellum United States, in THE INVENTION OF 
ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES 331 (David S. 
Landes, et al., eds, 2010) (“There was general agreement among the new country’s leaders that the 
national government was not functioning efficiently under the Articles of Confederation, so a 
constitutional federal system was introduced relatively quickly”). 
49 Id. (“The representatives of the individual states conscientiously guarded their powers and, in 
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Another important evolution and invention during that period that 
stimulated innovators to take a risk and start a new innovation-driven 
business was patent law, which gave innovators strong property rights, 
while also allowing knowledge spillovers and sharing of information. 
Historian Steven Lubar stated that the “[n]ineteenth-century patent law 
embodied a delicate balance of monopoly, to encourage invention; the 
dissemination of new ideas, to encourage the increase of knowledge; and 
ease of use of patents, to encourage innovation.”50    
B. The period between 1865 and 1920 
During the period between 1865 and 1920, the State governments (rather 
than the federal government) had an active role in subsidizing 
transportation, making western lands accessible to those who wanted to 
develop them, mapping the location of raw material properties and 
financing education (and institutions) in order to supply technological 
knowledge, according to economic historian Lamoreaux.51 During that 
period, holders of intellectual property enjoyed strong protection, provided 
by the US patent laws. In addition to the modest cost protection, the creation 
of a strong patent law system helped to spread the vast information of novel 
technologies.52  
An additional important development during that period was the 
establishment of the National Banking System. By creating the National 
Banking System, the federal government succeeded in instituting a 
standardized national currency that decreased transactions costs in 
interregional trade.53 Despite the fact that at that period the National 
 
 
Article I, Section 8, relinquished to the federal government only those rights they believed were 
essential. Article I, Section 10, restricts individual state’s dealing with foreign powers and prohibits the 
creation of state paper money. It included the famed contract clause that establishes the sanctity of 
contract, the deliberate protection of property rights, and the equally famed commerce clause that 
prohibits restrictions on interstate commerce”).  
50 Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE, 932, 934 
(1991); see also Cain, supra note 48, at 331.  
51 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Entrepreneurship in the United States, 1865-1920, in THE INVENTION OF 
ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES 391-92 (David 
Landes et al. eds., 2010) (According to Lamoreaux, state and local governments, from approximately 
1865-1920, played a more dynamic part in the economy, but even at those levels, governments mainly 
got involved in ways that improved the security and transparency of economic transactions. That policy 
changed only with the rise of big business, when governments started taking a considerable regulatory 
function – first at the state level and then at the federal level). 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
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Banking System had some wretched consequences that enhanced economic 
uncertainty,54 the end result of creating a national standardized currency was 
overall beneficial.  
C. The Rise of Large, Vertically Integrated American 
Corporations 
The market economy in the twentieth century in the United States has 
classically been characterized as the “harnessing of technology by 
entrepreneurs working for large vertically integrated American 
corporations”, according to historian Margaret Graham, “at first as a wholly 
private sector phenomenon, and then in cooperation with an increasingly 
interventionist federal government.”55  
 Graham divided that period into three different parts with respect to 
entrepreneurship.56 The first, characterized as the fiscally frenzied interwar 
period, covers the years of 1920 to 1941.57 According to Graham, the U.S. 
government tried to push for productivity and supplied many opportunities 
in the fast-growing industries.58 However, this development was followed 
by a rapid downfall of the numerous new companies prior to and throughout 
the Great Depression. The era ended with the U.S. entering into World War 
II.59   
The second period covers the years between 1941 until 1974, from 
World War II until the commencement of a lengthy phase of inflation, which 
began with the Vietnam War.60 According to Graham, during that period, 
large corporations did not regard innovation as a high priority. Moreover, 
innovation was unsolicited and unwelcomed in various sectors of the U.S. 
industry, excluding areas selected for “high-tech” businesses, which were 
desirable to the U.S. military advancements and were at times crossovers 
that could commercialize technology that was initially developed for 
military purposes for civil products.61  
The third period, between 1975 and 2000, is sometimes referred to as the 
 
 
54 Id.  
55 Margaret B.W. Graham, Entrepreneurship in the United States, 1920-2000, in THE INVENTION 
OF ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES (David Landes 
et al. eds., 2010). 
56 Id. at 404.  
57 See id. (according to Graham, this era is characterized by a search for economic self-regulation). 
58 See id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 See id. (according to Graham, there was constant national mobilization during that era; however, 
there was fairly stagnant economic equilibrium, highlighting optimization). 
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third industrial revolution.62 This period is distinguished from the previous 
two due to the combination of the information revolution and globalization 
trends.63 It began with a period of stagflation and was perpetuated by the 
U.S. financial institutions’ insurgency.64 It concluded in a sequence of 
financial bubbles and the collapse of the telecommunications industry and 
the dot-com craze.65 The following are some examples of successful 
government intervention in the market during these periods.  
1. Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA) 
The Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA) example is an 
illustration of a successful intervention of a U.S. government policy during 
the 1960s, which was responsible for the invention of the Internet.66 The 
Pentagon created the ARPA in order to provide funding for technologies 
following the “Soviet success with Sputnik”.67  
The initiatives of ARPA computer offices cultivated a diverse and 
distinct government model that funded research. It took a proactive 
approach to innovation, in stark contrast to other federal agencies, which 
were generally reactive. It was highly active in determining the course of 
the research.68 Its goal was to generate a scientific community in order to 
focus on specific technological challenges, with audiences in the public 
sector, universities and private corporations.69 ARPA operated small offices 
staffed with top engineers and scientists, who were given extensive budget 
autonomy to sponsor promising ideas.70  
 
 
62 See id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 See id.; See also Block, supra note 16 (according to Block, in 1962, ARPA’s Information 
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) was originally established, and played a central role in the 
development of computer science. IPTO granted funds to establish computer science departments at 
major universities and financed a series of research project that successfully pushed forward 
developments in human-computer interface). 
67 See Block, supra note 16, at 7. 
68 See id. (According to Block, “ARPA did not leave most of the initiative in the hands of the 
research community, therefore, it’s policy was different from other federal agencies, such as the National 
Science Foundation, which relied on peer review of research proposals”).  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 7. (“ARPA made a practice of hiring visionary technologists and giving them a very high 
degree of autonomy to give out research funds. The organizational structure was extremely lean with 
very small staffs and a minimum of paperwork. ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office 
(IPTO) was initially established in 1962 and played a central role in the advance of computer technology 
in the 1960s and 1970s. IPTO provided the resources to create computer science departments at major 
universities and funded a series of research project that successfully pushed forward advances in the 
human-computer interface. In fact, many of the technologies that were ultimately incorporated into the 
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ARPA did not draw a line between “basic research” and “applied 
research.”71 Funding was granted to various groups such as start-up firms, 
university-based researchers, and industry syndicates.72 In order to prevent 
abuse or waste, ARPA staff transferred resources from unproductive groups 
to more promising, productive and profitable ones.73  
APRA provided firms with venture capital-like services including 
mentoring, strategic planning, technological and business brokering 
services.74 It assisted firms in reaching the phase of commercial capability.75 
It made cooperative connections among resources, ideas and people from 
diverse development and research sites, which is an essential component to 
the proposed “Coalition” model.76 
The government played the crucial role of a “market-maker,”77 as it took 
the risk-bearing role (that private actors during that period were not able to 
play) and essentially made the high technology world and Internet that we 
know and use today possible.   
2. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is another 
example of a successful government intervention in the market via the 
creation of legislation aimed at stimulating an existing market or even 
starting a new market.78 It is also a leading example of a United States 
 
 
personal computer were developed by ARPA-funded researchers”).  
71 Id. at 8. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 7-8 (according to Block, ARPA employed visionary and creative technologists and gave 
them the autonomy to grant research funds). 
74 Id. at 8. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25 (according to Hockett & Omarova, “market-making” 
means “government’s playing a particular risk-bearing role that private actors themselves sometimes but 
not always are able to play either (a) makes a publicly beneficial market possible, or (b) facilitates an 
incipient such market’s growth to critical mass”).   
78 There is a long list of important federal legislation concerning innovation: Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. 
L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-201 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)); 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980); Small Business 
Innovation Development Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006); National Cooperative Research Act, Pub. 
L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05); NSF Establishes Program for 
Engineering Research Centers (1985); Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-564, 106 Stat. 4249 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006)); Department of Commerce 
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) (1988); Manufacturing Extension Program (1988); Defense 
Industrial and Technology Base Initiative (1991); High Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-194, § 102, 105 Stat. 1495, 1598-99 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5512) (1991); Small Business 
Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (1992). For further details on 
this legislation see Block, supra note 16, at 11-12.  
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public-private partnership that stimulates innovative new technologies.79  
The SBIR program was founded in 1982, and was intended80 to 
encourage “small businesses”81 to develop new products and processes as 
well as present valuable research for the nation’s research and development 
efforts.82 The program mandates the eleven federal agencies (with 
extramural research budgets in excess of $100 million) to allocate a certain 
percentage83 of their total extramural research and development budgets for 
grants or contracts to small businesses84 conducting research and 
development that have commercialization potential and meet the needs of 
the United States Government.85  
The SBIR program continues to play an important strategic role in the 
United States’ innovation efforts. In the words of its founder Roland 
Tibbetts, “[t]he US leads the world in three areas important to economic 
 
 
79 See CHARLES WESSNER, SBIR AND THE PHASE III CHALLENGE OF 
COMMERCIALIZATION: REPORT OF A SYMPOSIUM 9 (National Academics Press 2007). 
According to Wessner:  
“Commercializing SBIR-funded technologies though federal procurement is no less 
challenging for innovative small companies. Finding private sources of funding to further 
develop even successful SBIR Phase II projects—those innovations that have demonstrated 
technical and commercial feasibility—is often difficult because the eventual ‘market’ for 
products is unlikely to be large enough to attract private venture funding. As Mark Redding of 
Impact Technologies noted at the conference, venture capitalists tend to avoid funding firms 
focused on government contracts citing higher costs, regulatory burdens, and limited markets 
associated with government contracting.” 
80 About SBIR, SBIR/STTR, http://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (The 
following are the program’s objectives: “Stimulate technological innovation; Meet Federal research and 
development needs; Foster and encourage participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by socially 
and economically disadvantaged persons; [and] Increase private-sector commercialization of 
innovations derived from federal research and development funding”).  
81 “Small businesses” for the purpose of the Act are businesses with less than 500 people.  
82 See WESSNER, supra note 79, at xiii (“SBIR grants and contracts are intended to stimulate 
innovative new technologies to help agencies meet the specific research and development needs of the 
nation”).  
83 For example, 2.8% of such budget in 2014.  
84 It should be noted that the SBIR does not fund “Phase III” innovation, which is a stage of 
development when the company and technology is expected to obtain private funding or government 
contracts. Instead, funding is targeted to the pre-commercial stage of technology development. See 
Matthew R. Keller & Fred Block, Explaining the Transformation in the US Innovation System: The 
Impact of a Small Government Program, 11 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 629, 640 (2013) (“Initially, the program 
provided up to $50,000 (now $150,000 under the 2011 authorization) in ‘Phase I’ support – generally 
up to 6 months – to ‘explore [] the technical merit or feasibility of an idea or technology.’ Phase I 
awardees could subsequently apply for up to $500,000 (now $1,000,000) of ‘Phase II’ funding – 
generally up to 2 years of work – during which ‘R&D work is performed and the developer evaluates 
commercialization potential’”). 
85 This program facilitates the award of approximately $2.5 billion every year. See Keller & Block, 
supra note 84, at 640 (The federal agencies “were given considerable leeway to determine how they met 
their obligations under the Act; they could provide funds as grants or contracts and they could solicit 
proposals with narrow or broad specifications of relevant research”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:267 
 
 
 
 
growth - basic research, small high tech firms and venture capital. SBIR 
pulls them together.”86 There are many examples of successful companies 
that received early-stage financing from SBIC, such as Symantec, DaVinci, 
Qualcomm and iRobot.  
Participation in the SBIR program affords many benefits (in addition to 
funding) including advanced networking and protection of intellectual 
property.  Participants in the program “get preferential access to federal 
procurement opportunities.”87 There are protections for participating 
companies in the program (who do not yet have patent rights), which protect 
their innovative ideas from theft by competitors or peer reviewers.88 It 
should be noted that the government (for a fee) has the right to license the 
technology of the small company that participates in the SBIR program. 
However, the technology itself remains the property of the company.89   
There are several events and legislations that contributed to the 
establishment of the SBIR program. In 1958, the Small Business Investment 
Companies (SBICs) Act90 was enacted in order to offer matching federal 
funds for private investment (it was used by individual angels in order to 
fund innovation).91 In 1977, the United States National Science Foundation 
(NSF) responded to various processes in the market and shifted its policy, 
from focusing on research and sciences to establishing a pilot, the SBIR 
program, which was designed to encourage small firms to develop their 
ideas and innovations into products and processes.92  
The NSF’s SBIR initiative was a response to the following factors and 
events. First, in the late 1970s, the American economy suffered through two 
oil supply shocks, recessions, rising prices, and stagnant productivity, in 
addition to facing rising international competition from Japan and 
Germany.93 These economic crises and challenges invoked a nationwide 
reaction and established novel public policies, which centered on long-
 
 
86 See About SBIR, supra note 80. 
87 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640 (“[A]gencies that engage in substantial procurement, 
such as the Department of Defense (DOD), would expect to purchase successful technologies, or link 
them to projects pursued by prime contractors. SBIR legislation fostered such relationships by providing 
awardees with preferential access to federal procurement opportunities”). 
88 See id. (“These protections helped to assure small firms that peer reviewers and potential 
competitors such as prime defense contractors would be less inclined to ‘borrow’ ideas from firms that 
have not yet obtained patents”); see also WESSNER, supra note 79.  
89 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640-41.  
90 Small Business Investment Companies Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 384 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 681-687h (1958)). 
91 SBIC was used by individual angels in order to fund innovation. See Darian M. Ibrahim, 
Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 741 (2010). 
92 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 639 (According to Keller and Block, “NSF had traditionally 
focused on academic science and engineering research, and the pilot program represented a significant 
shift”). 
93 See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 2.  
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standing productivity growth.94  
Second, there was an increase in appreciation of the fact that small firms 
drive innovation.95 Third, there were constant deliberations within the 
Executive Branch on how to encourage innovation and stimulate the United 
States market96  due to concerns about a diminishing competitiveness of the 
United States (during the period of stagflation).97  
The pilot program was very successful, and during the 1980s the United 
States Congress passed several laws that allowed the NSF to institute the 
SBIR program. The first legislation was the Bayh-Dole Act (1980),98 which 
allowed scientists, for the first time, to keep the intellectual property rights 
of innovation that was developed from federal funds. Scientists who 
received funds from the federal government to conduct research could form 
new startup firms that could profit from discoveries that arose from the 
federally funded research and even own the intellectual property. In that 
way, the Bayh-Dole Act encouraged startup formation.99  
The second legislation was the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act (1980),100 which was the first technology transfer law. It was 
enacted in order to improve and develop cooperative research between 
publicly funded entities and corporations by requiring federal laboratories 
 
 
94 Id.  
95 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 629.  
96 Id. at 639 (“As early as the Nixon Administration, there was recognition of the urgency of 
capitalizing on US technological leadership to strengthen competitiveness. Hurt (2011) shows that many 
ideas about the use of public-private partnerships to facilitate technology development emerged in a 
comprehensive review carried out by the Nixon Administration, but they were not implemented when 
the Administration was overcome by Watergate”). 
97 Id. at 639-40 (“[T]hese ideas re-emerged during the Carter Administration in the Domestic Policy 
Review on Industrial Innovation that was itself a response to concerns about declining US 
competitiveness. Headed by Jordan Baruch, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, the review began in 1978 
and culminated in a series of Industrial Innovation Initiatives Proposed by Carter in October, 1979. Two 
immediate results of the effort were the passage by Congress in 1980 of the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act and the Bayh-Dole Act. Stevenson-Wydler authorized Commerce and NFS 
to create Centers for Industrial Technology and to promote cooperative research between corporations 
and publicly funded entities”); see also James Turner, The Next Innovation Revolution: Laying the 
Groundwork for the United States, INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, & GLOBALIZATION, June 2006, 
at 123.   
98 Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 78.  
99 While the SBIR provided a flow of government dollars to support startups, the legislation of the 
Bayh-Dole Act actually encouraged startup formation. The Bayh-Dole Act authorized university-based 
scientists to form new startup firms that could exploit the discoveries that transpired from the federally 
funded research, while their startup company would own the intellectual property.   See Keller & Block, 
supra note 84, at 641 (“Parallel efforts were designed to shift the focus of scientists and engineers at 
government laboratories toward technologies with commercial potential.  If these efforts were 
successful, SBIR would be a source of funding.”).  
100 Federal Technology Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 3710c (1989)). 
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to actively engage in technology transfer.101 It allowed federal laboratories 
to transfer technology to nonfederal entities easily. It also authorized the 
NSF to create Centers for Industrial Technology.102  
The third legislation was the Small Business Innovation Development 
Act (1982),103 which recommended and then formed the SBIR (then NSF 
pilot) program. It also called for larger federal backing for small innovative 
firms.104    
The fourth legislation was the Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) Act,105 which was created in order to enhance collaboration 
between small firms and a university or federal laboratory.  
In the past, the tone from other (than NSF) federal agencies towards the 
SBIR was hostile. According to Matthew Keller and Fred Block, 
“[a]dministrators saw it as a tax on research funds; it reduced their discretion 
and added considerable costs of screening applications and contracting with 
multiple small firms since the legislation provided no funds to cover 
administration.”106 
Nevertheless, federal agencies changed their attitude towards SBIR 
(especially ones that were directly involved with the programs). Thanks to 
the successful SBIR program, officials quickly learned that “small firms 
were often able to deliver new capabilities, more quickly than large, 
established contractors which tended to be slower and more 
bureaucratic.”107 
To sum up, according to economists Keller and Block,108 this small 
government program (SBIR) played a central role109 in revolutionizing the 
role of innovation in the United States economy via four distinctive 
mechanisms: encouraging engineers and scientists to become entrepreneurs; 
direct funding; signaling opportunities for private investors (and 
 
 
101 The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act compels federal laboratories to set apart a 
certain percentage of the laboratory budget exclusively for technology transfer activities.  Stevenson-
Wydler Act, supra note 78.   
102 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640 (“This recommendation was implemented in 1982, 
under Roanld Reagan, when the Small Innovation Development Act was signed into law. The legislation 
had bipartisan support, but Senator Kennedy played a central role in marshalling it through the Senate”); 
see also Arthur Obermayer, Senator Ted Kennedy’s Role in the Birth of the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program, (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.zynsys.com/sbir/Kennedy_&_SBIR.pdf.  
103 Small Business Innovation Development Act, supra note 78.   
104 Id.   
105 Small Business Technology Transfer Act, supra note 78. The STTR provides aid to 
collaborations between a university or federal lab and a small firm.   
106 See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 641. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. (They suggest the term “social resonance” in order to show “how even small government 
programs can play an important role in altering large scale institutional dynamics”). 
109 See id. (Keller & Block propose the term “social resonance” to capture the catalytic role that the 
SBIR, a government program, played given the right circumstances). 
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certification); and creating pathways to government procurement.110  
SBIR was a federal government initiative that changed the United States 
innovation system during the 1980s. Federal, state and local government 
initiatives influenced innovation and development efforts in states such as 
Massachusetts and California.  
D. Startup America & Additional Federal Initiatives led by the 
Obama Administration to Promote Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship and Growth 
In recent years, efforts were made by the Obama administration to boost 
innovation by encouraging technology incubation and venture capital. 
President Obama111 launched the “Startup America” program, a national 
drive to present mentorship and funding in order to grow new businesses.112 
Startup America is an umbrella initiative that included the following 
efforts.  First, it centered on increasing entrepreneurial education and 
mentorship.113 Second, it included proposals to boost entrepreneurs’ access 
to capital.114 Third, it attempted to limit regulatory barriers to starting and 
growing companies.115 Fourth, it prompted technology commercialization 
efforts by universities.116 Finally, it aimed at generating new entrepreneurial 
opportunities in crucial industries such as education, healthcare and 
energy.117  
On September 27, 2010, Congress and President Obama118 signed into 
 
 
110 See id.  
111 See Russell Nichols, State Governments: The Latest Venture Capitalists, GOVERNING MAGAZINE 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.governing.com/State-Governments-Latest-Venture-Capitalists.html (As part 
of his State of the Union pledge to “win the future” by boosting innovation, President Obama stated: 
“Part of the mission of the program is to eliminate the capital gains tax on some small business 
investments and speed up the patent process.  The U.S. Small Business Administration was directed $2 
billion to match private-sector investment capital for under-the-radar startups and firms with high-
growth potential”).   
112 Id.  
113 See Aaron Chatterji et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19013, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19013.pdf. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Small Business Jobs Act – Learn What’s in It, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/27/president-obama-signs-small-
business-jobs-act-learn-whats-it (According to President Obama, the act is “important because small 
businesses produce most of the new jobs in this country. They are the anchors of our Main Streets. They 
are part of the promise of America – the idea that if you’ve got a dream and you’re willing to work hard, 
you can succeed. That’s what leads a worker to leave a job to become her own boss. That’s what propels 
a basement inventor to sell a new product – or an amateur chef to open a restaurant. It’s this promise 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:267 
 
 
 
 
law the Small Business Jobs Act (the “Act”),119 which authorized the 
establishment of the Small Business Lending Fund Program (that was 
administered by the Treasury Department) in order to “increase the 
availability of credit for small businesses.”120 While from the outset it was 
admirable that the administration was concerned with small businesses and 
introduced legislation aimed at boosting the economy by creating jobs, there 
were some issues with the Act that should be addressed.    
For example, there should be a distinction between an innovation driven 
entrepreneurial firm and a small medium business enterprise.121 As 
journalist Annie Lowery puts it, “[s]cupper the image of Mark Zuckerberg 
handcrafting a new service to revolutionize how we socialize and adding 
thousands of jobs to the economy. Replace it with the image of a gas-station 
owner, servicing a crowded market, happy to be able to make his kid's 
soccer games without a boss breathing down his neck, and more wary of 
innovation than eager for it.”122  
Several scholars123 have attempted to define what constitutes an 
“entrepreneur,” and show that the classic small business owner is different 
than the innovation driven entrepreneur.124 Erik Hurt and Benjamin 
 
 
that has drawn millions to our shores and made our economy the envy of the world”).  
119 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010). 
120 See id. The Act authorizes the creation of the Small Business Lending Fund Program 
administered by the Treasury Department to make capital investments in eligible institutions, in order 
to increase the availability of credit for small businesses. 
121 See Annie Lowrey, Why Small Businesses Aren't Innovative, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2011/09/why_small_businesses_arent_innovati
ve.html (“The bulk of small businesses being created, in short, are not particularly innovative ones.  Few 
spend any money on research or development, getting a patent, or otherwise trademarking a new idea.  
Most simply help provide already-crowded markets with familiar goods such as legal work or gas or 
nearby groceries.  Nor are they growing businesses either”).  See also Aulet & Murray, supra note 1 
(MIT professors Aulet and Murray on the difference between the two definitions: “Not all startup 
companies are created equal.  Although both innovation-driven enterprises (IDEs) and traditional small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can provide valuable products and services and create jobs, IDEs 
– startups focused on addressing global markets based on technological, process or business model 
innovation – can potentially create hundreds or even thousands of high-skill jobs if they succeed”). 
122 See Lowrey, supra note 121. 
123 See Erik Hurst & Benjamin Wild Pugsley, What Do Small Businesses Do? 73-75 (Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/2011_fall_bpea_conference_hurst.pdf (“[E]conomic theory usually considers 
entrepreneurs as individuals who (1) innovate and render aging technologies obsolete (Schumpeter, 
1942), (2) take economic risks (Knight (1921); Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979); Kanbur (1979), and 
Jovanovic (1979)), or (3) are considered jacks-of-all-trades in the sense that they have a broad skill set 
(Lazear, 2005).  Policy makers often consider entrepreneurs to be job creators or the engines of economic 
growth”). 
124 Id. (discussing the distinction between small businesses that intend to innovate and small business 
participants that “provide a relatively standardized good or service to an existing customer base. 
Specifically, these industries primarily include skilled craftsmen (e.g., plumbers, electricians, 
contractors, and painters), skilled professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, and architects), insurance 
and real estate agents, doctors, dentists, mechanics, beauticians, restaurateurs, and small shop keepers 
(e.g., gas station owners and grocery store owners)”).  
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Pugsley125 demonstrate in a new study that the distinction between the small 
business owner and an innovation driven entrepreneur is very important 
because most small businesses do not innovate, remain small in size 
throughout their existence and do not provide the desired job creation that 
policy makers are intending to create. Moreover, Hurt and Pugsley also 
illustrate how very few of the small businesses in the market actually spend 
resources on innovation, such as filing for protection of intellectual property 
rights (that include registering for a patent, copyright or trademark) or 
investing in research or development.126  
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (the “JOBS”) Act,127 which was 
signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012, is another 
legislative effort worthy of mention. This Act has been met with mixed 
reviews and reactions.128 On one hand, entrepreneurs and emerging growth 
companies are able to use novel practices in order to raise capital.129 On the 
other hand, critics (securities regulators, consumer and investor advocates) 
worry about Ponzi schemes and the future potential fraud to unaccredited 
investors. The media focuses on the aspect of crowdfunding.130 However, 
there are various new ways of raising capital according to the JOBS Act.131 
A comprehensive discussion of such securities laws concerns, as well as 
other legal considerations, are outside the scope of this article, and should 
be explored in additional research and commentary.132  
 
 
125 Id. (explaining that “nearly half of all new businesses report providing an existing good or service 
to an existing market”). 
126 Id. 
127 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 315 (2012) 
(codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of United States Codes). 
128 See Chatterji et al., supra note 113 (“The focus of the JOBS Act was on reducing the financial 
reporting requirements for small firms and facilitating crowd funding, making it easier for individuals 
to invest in or contribute funds to start-ups. It raised the limit of Regulation A securities offerings to $50 
million, lifted the ban on general solicitation, and created a new class of companies—called emerging 
growth companies—that will have fewer disclosure requirements”).  
129 Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared Value Through the Lens 
of Sandra Day O'Connor's iCivics, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming),  . 
130 The SEC will make a final determination on this issue following a 90-day period for the public 
to issue comments. 
131 See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn't All 'Crowdfunding,'  FORBES (Oct. 8, 
2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding/ 
(discussing the JOBS Act and explaining some of the main impacts, as follows: 1) There are special 
rules for ‘Emerging Growth Companies’ in order to encourage initial public offering (IPO). Twitter just 
used this provision for its IPO. 2) There will be significant changes to rules governing private offerings 
with regards to General Solicitation and Accredited Investors. 3) The legalizing of crowd investing (vs. 
crowdfunding). 4) Regulation A. 5) Private companies can remain private for a longer period of time as 
the Act increases the limit on the number of shareholders that a company may have prior to being subject 
to the Exchange Act annual reporting requirements).  
132 See Chatterji et al., supra note 113 (“The federal government has also taken other lower profile 
steps, under the banner of Startup America, to explicitly to promote high-growth entrepreneurship. The 
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E. Criticism 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, governments have 
experimented with vast public interventions both in the U.S. and other 
Western economies.133 The U.S. government, like many Western 
governments,134 focused on financing the mainly inadequately run and very 
troubled firms in the economy.135   
Both the Bush and Obama administrations tried to restart the market by 
dealing with the "troubled assets" that were overcrowding the banks' 
balance sheets—mainly due to housing-related loans and securities.136 In 
September 2008, the Bush Administration proposed to use $700 billion of 
public funds on direct purchases of these troubled assets.137 However, the 
Bush administration eventually decided to call off this plan after running 
into forceful opposition, especially since it seemed it would be hard for the 
U.S. Treasury to assess the worth of these troubled assets.138  
In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a plan called the 
“Public-Private Investment Program” for investing up to $ 1 trillion in order 
to finance competing and privately managed funds devoted to buying these 
troubled assets.139 If market crisis calls for immense public resources to be 
used for interventions, then perhaps funds should be dedicated to advancing 
new enterprises instead of exclusively being used for bailing out troubled 
entities.140  
Entrepreneurial businesses contribute to job creation as they employ 
about half of the private-sector workers in the United States, and contribute 
to market innovation as they generate “approximately half of non-farm 
private GDP,” according to William Bygrave.141 This article calls for an 
intense focus on entrepreneurship and venture capital as means of 
 
 
Obama Administration modified the Small Business Investment Company program to offer two new $1 
billion funds to invest in high-growth businesses. Several government agencies, including the SBA, 
Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Energy have sponsored business accelerators. The USPTO also 
announced a new fast track 12-month patent application process that is especially targeted at 
entrepreneurial firms. The National Institutes of Health have simplified the process to license 
technologies for biomedical start-ups”).  
133 See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 1. 
134 The Swiss government infused $60 Billion into UBS in exchange for ten percent of the firm’s 
equity. See id. at 1 (“UBS Given an Infusion of Capital”). 
135 See id. (The US Government invested “over $150 Billion in AIG . . . in September and October 
in exchange for 81 percent of the firm’s stock”).  
136 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Buying Troubled Assets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 344 (2009). 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 1; WILLIAM BYGRAVE, ANDREW 
C. CORBETT & ANDREW ZACHARAKIS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 4 (2d ed. 2011).   
141 See BYGRAVE & ZACHARAKIS, supra note 140, at 2.  
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innovation that are the building blocks of our economy. In order to advance 
significantly and reliably, U.S. regulators, as well as their international 
counterparts, should concentrate on reviving the start-up market, with an 
emphasis on innovative technology, venture capitalists and high-growth 
entrepreneurial firms.  
III. THE MATCHMAKER PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUND INITIATIVE 
The Matchmaker public-private venture capital investment fund 
initiative builds on the Coalition Model, in order to proactively promote 
innovation, technology and new venture formation, while also bridging 
some of the financial inefficiencies and information gaps associated with 
investment in early-stage innovation driven enterprises.  It encourages U.S. 
government agencies to fund research and innovation by identifying 
specific technological challenges and collaborating with audiences in the 
public sector, research institutions and universities, and private corporations 
in order to advance commercialization efforts based on these challenges. 
There are several potential benefits to adopting such a proactive policy. 
First, it might encourage future engineers, scientists and innovators to take 
a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second, it provides direct funding to 
research and development needs that might otherwise not be used. Third, it 
can signal that there are opportunities for private investors to invest in such 
ventures, and perhaps even serve as some sort of certification. Fourth, it will 
create a direct pathway for small firms to access government procurement.  
The “Matchmaker” initiative is a promising targeted policy endeavor 
aimed at designing a platform for a competitive venture capital industry in 
the United States that promotes venture capital investment in early stage 
technology firms (start-ups). The proposed design is intended to attract the 
participation of professional venture capital fund managers (from the 
private market) to the Matchmaker initiative in order to produce public-
private venture capital funds. The Matchmaker venture capital funds will be 
legally separate and independent of the government and will focus on 
making equity investments in private-sector early stage start-up firms while 
using government-supplied funds.  
Another benefit of the Matchmaker funds would be the advancement of 
continuous procurement relationships between the government agency that 
will provide the funding and the technology companies that the funds will 
invest in. This initiative will allow the government agencies to secure 
innovative technology that will be updated according to the constantly 
developing needs of the commercial market, to keep up with technology 
advancement, and to secure funds for its research and development 
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missions.  
The purpose of this initiative is not to create a new high-technology 
industry, but rather to create a platform for investment in early stage 
technology innovations, research and development. It is based on the 
successful Israeli Yozma Program142 as well as on the experience of the 
success story of Silicon Valley.143   
A. The Reasons for Government Intervention in the Current Market 
The following are various reasons that require government intervention 
in the market in the form of the proposed Matchmaker initiative. First, 
economic analysis encourages government to present subsidies to small 
high-technology firms because the social returns from such firms’ research 
and development expenses might surpass their private returns.144 The social 
return to the government is much greater than to private investors145 because 
private investors cannot reap the full benefits of their investment through 
profits where radical innovation is concerned.146 Moreover, some scholars 
suggest that the spillover problems are predominantly acute among small 
firms because they are commonly incapable of effectively defending their 
intellectual property or extracting the majority of the rents in the product 
 
 
142 See Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evolutionary Targeting, 18 J. EVOL. ECON. 151, 159 
(2008) [hereinafter Evolutionary Targeting] (“[T]he Yozma program [was] implemented during 1993-
1998”). It was a policy that essentially created the platform for the Israeli venture capital industry. See 
Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evaluating Venture Capital Policies: Methodological Lessons from 
the Israeli Experience 14, Paper Presented at the DRUID Summer Conference 2003 on Creating, Sharing 
and Transferring Knowledge (June 2003) [hereinafter Methodological Lessons]. It should be noted that 
the purpose of the Yozma Program was not to create a new high-technology industry, rather the venture 
capital industry evolved from an existing Israeli foundation of high-technology capabilities, innovation, 
research and development.  
143 See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON 
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996) [hereinafter REGIONAL ADVANTAGE]; see also Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Covenants 
not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 588 (1999); see also Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give 
Me Death – The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 265, 271 (2006).  
144 See Josh Lerner, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR 
Program, 72 J. BUS. 285 (1990) [hereinafter Venture Capitalist]; see Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D 
Spillovers, SCAND. J. ECON., Supp. 1992, at 29, (evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for 
research and development).   
145 See, e.g., Browyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development, in 
TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., The 
Brookings Institution 1995) (providing evidence that the social return to R&D is much above the private 
return); see Yoram Margalioth, Not A Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated 
Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493 (2007); see also Griliches, supra note 144, at 251-52.   
146 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 145; see Margalioth, supra note 145; see also Griliches, supra note 
144, at 252. 
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market.147  
Second, by giving awards to start-up firms, the government is certifying 
these start-ups to the private market. The offering of a start-up company’s 
equity may be associated with the “lemons” problem and “adverse 
selection.”148 As noted earlier in this Article, there is a financing and 
information gap, which is called the “Valley of Death.”149 The Valley of 
Death describes the financial difficulties that start-up firms experience in 
the early-stage of their companies’ technology development, which is the 
stage between the early stage of discovery (that is generated from basic 
research) to the later stage of commercialization of the product or process. 
It results from the uncertainty, high-risk and information asymmetry 
problem, which is associated with investing in start-ups, and precludes 
investors from backing such firms.   
The following are five broad stages in the innovation process, as well as 
the financial sources that are usually available to start-up at these stages. 
First, the stage of basic research, where funding is usually available to 
entrepreneurs from government sources like NSF, NIH, SBIR phase I, and 
from private corporate resources such as funding that large corporations 
allocate for the purposes of research and development; second, the stage of 
proof of concept or invention, where financing sources usually include 
private Angel investors, corporate research and development funds, 
government funding from SBIR phase II and technology labs; third, the 
 
 
147 See Venture Capitalist, supra note 144; see also Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates 
of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q. J. ECON. 221, 234 (1977).   
148 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970) (discussing the “adverse selection” problem, as well as 
firms’ offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem); see also Manuel Utset, 
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital Financed 
Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 56 (2002); see also PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE 
CAPITAL CYCLE 129 (1999). 
149 See Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J BUS. VENTURING 
97 (1988) (“67% of new businesses fail and discontinue within four years”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 19 (2000), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230896.pdf (“[A]pproximately 80% of new businesses . . . fail or no 
longer exist within 5 to 7 years of formation due to a lack of financial depth, a lack of management 
expertise, an unworkable business idea, or some combination of these factors.  The perceived high risk 
associated with new and rapidly growing companies is also borne out by the past performance of venture 
capital investments in the informal, unregulated equity capital market.  According to a recent study by 
the National Association of Seed and Venture Funds, only about 10 percent of venture capital 
investments meet their expected rate of return”); THOMAS ZIMMERER & NORMAN M. SCARBOROUGH, 
ESSENTIALS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2002) (asserting 
that 24% of small businesses fail within two years and 63% fail within six years); Amy E. Knaup, 
Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, at 50, 51 (stating that 34% of new businesses fail within their first two 
years and 56% fail within four years). 
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early-stage technology development stage, which is often termed as the 
Valley of Death because of the entrepreneur’s hardship in getting financing 
for this stage; fourth, the stage of product development, where private 
venture capitalist traditionally invest in start-up firms; fifth and last, the 
production or marketing stage, where financing sources include private 
venture capitalists, corporate venture capital, private equity or commercial 
debt. 
The Valley of Death can have a considerable effect on the productivity 
of government supported research and development efforts,150 especially 
since an alarming study by Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner explains that 
there is a ninety percent failure rate among early-stage firms who could not 
get venture capital backing.151 If the government will intervene and give 
awards to such firms, it will also certify the firms to private investors. Such 
certification can tackle the informational asymmetries problem that 
otherwise precludes investments.152  
Therefore, there is a market need for government intervention in order 
to encourage the creation, survival and growth of entrepreneurial firms, 
since the government already spends money (in the first innovation stage) 
in trying to boost research and development initiatives and “knowledge 
spillovers” (an exchange of ideas among individuals).  
Third, government intervention is primarily necessary at these times 
when private investors effectively have no appetite for investing in risky 
start-up companies.153 In recent years, large public firms are shying away 
from investments in research and development initiatives due to a 
philosophy of “shareholder primacy,” which precludes mangers from 
pursuing long-term projects or investments in entrepreneurial firms with 
uncertain returns154 because they are “exposed to ‘stock market sickness’ & 
short-term thinking,” which results in very low “social impact.”155  
Fourth and finally, due to the recent economic crisis and unstable 
economic environment, even venture capital investors, who might 
traditionally invest in such early innovation stages, are also reluctant to 
 
 
150 Ford et al., supra note 5; see Branscomb & Auerswald, supra note 5; see also Auerswald et al., 
supra note 5.   
151 Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New 
Wealth, UBIQUITY (Jan. 2002), http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=763904; see also, U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19 (approximately eighty percent of new businesses fail within 
five to seven years from their formation). 
152 See Venture Capitalist, supra note 144. 
153 See Joseph A. McCahery et al., Corporate Venture Capital: From Venturing to Partnering, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 4 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012).  
154 See SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6.   
155 See also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.  
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partake in such funding and prefer later stage investments.156  
B. The Role of the Venture Capital Industry in the U.S. Innovation 
Process 
 The venture capital industry has played, and continues to play, an 
important role in the United States innovation process for the following 
reasons. First, venture capitalists are active investors who provide many 
value added services to the technology companies that they invest in. Such 
services can vary, and include: strategic planning, mentoring, guidance, 
selecting management, lawyers, accountants, writing a business plan, etc.157  
Second, venture capitalists are fundamental to the formation of startup 
firms.158 Third, venture capitalists are actively engaged with the following 
innovation networks: global as well as local technology markets,159 
financial institutions,160 specialized labor markets161 and professional 
business service markets.162 Finally, venture capital investment spurs more 
technological innovation than corporate venture capital investment.163 
Venture capital firms use unique contracts and organizational 
capabilities in order to overcome the uncertainty, risk, information 
asymmetry, agency,164 “lemons” and “adverse selection”165 related 
problems.  The following are a few examples of studies that describe the 
successful outcomes from the relationship between venture capital investors 
and their portfolio firms in the United States (as compared to startup firms 
that were not backed by venture capitalists).166 First, startup companies that 
 
 
156 See McCahery et al., supra note 153, at 4.  
157 For further information on services provided by VC, see GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148.  
158 See Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 4.  
159 See id.  
160 See id.  
161 See id.  
162 See id.  
163  See Samuel S. Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to 
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674 (2000) (Kortum and Lerner found that on average each dollar 
invested by Venture Capital contributes to the rate of patents three to four times more than corporate 
R&D. Moreover, from the late 1970’s to the mid 1990’s VC represented only three percent of corporate 
R&D, but are responsible for ten to twelve percent of privately funded innovation); see also Joseph 
Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 289 (1999) (reviewing tax 
treatment of startups). 
164 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 129. 
165 Akerlof, supra note 148, at 493; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 56; see also GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 148, at 129.  
166 It should be noted that the research based on the Israeli VC industry showed similar results 
concerning the performance of venture capital backed firms. According to Avnimelech and Teubal, this 
includes a “higher success rate (Exit rate: IPO or M&A), younger age at IPO, higher IPO valuation, and 
higher growth in sales.” Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5. 
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are backed-up by venture capitalists enjoy a greater access to global 
markets.167 Second, venture capital investors enable their portfolio 
companies to go public faster (it seems that investor uncertainty is reduced 
due to venture capital presence and monitoring), and, in effect, help their 
portfolio companies to get lower interest rates on bank loans.168 Third, there 
is superior overall post initial public offering performance of venture capital 
backed portfolio firms, both in terms of overall growth rate and stock 
price.169 Finally, venture capital backed firms invest a larger fraction of their 
total expenses in research and development, as well as have higher growth 
rates in terms of revenues and assets.170  
C. The Initiative – Governance Mechanisms 
The initiative proposes to establish public-private equity funds, which 
will be organized as independent not-for-profit corporations, in order to 
bridge the financial and information gap between budding commercial 
innovation and the technology needs of a participating government 
agency.171 There is extensive literature on regulatory capture, which 
 
 
167 See Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 4.  
168 See William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial 
Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 882-83 (1991); see also Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture 
Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 
447, 449-50 (1990) (It appears that “venture capitalists are able to bring public the firms they back earlier 
than would have otherwise been possible”). This likely occurs because of the industries in which the 
venture capitalists focus. Venture capitalists take a monitoring role, demonstrated by serving on the 
board, maintaining the investment beyond the IPO, and holding a large equity position in a portfolio 
firm. Investor uncertainty is reduced with the quality of the venture capitalist's monitoring skill. A 
decrease in investor uncertainty was found to decrease IPO underpricing. These findings support the 
notion that venture capitalists play an important role in new enterprise. 
169 See Megginson & Weiss, supra note 168, at 879 (comparison of venture capital backed IPOs 
with non-venture capital backed IPOs from 1983 through 1987, which are “matched as closely as 
possible by industry and offering size.” They conclude that the presence of venture capitalists (in the 
issuing firms) serves to “lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the 
offering firm”); see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5.  
170 See William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. 
FIN. 89 (2005) (“Venture capitalists create value through their role as active investors, and government 
and business leaders around the world have come to realize that venture capital and private equity 
investing can be a significant force in promoting economic development and technological progress. In 
general, countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to investors; the ratio of 
venture capital spending to GDP for common law countries is nearly double that in civil law countries. 
Government efforts to promote venture capital would probably be better focused on eliminating 
regulatory road-blocks, lowering taxes, and providing a favorable investor climate”); see also 
Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5.  
171 See John T. Reinert, Comment, In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence Agency as Venture Capitalist, 
33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 677, 679 (2013) (noting that there are attempts/desires by government 
agencies (Army, NASA & USA Postal Service) to invest in technology ventures); He cites Memo to 
Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL ST. J.: Deals & Deal Makers, May 9, 2003, at C5; 
News Release, NASA Forms Partnership with Red Planet Capital, Inc., NASA (Sept. 20, 2006), 
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/sep/HQ_06317_red_capital.html; see also Marc Kaufman, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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suggests that government involvement in the market may be distorted as a 
result of politicians or interest groups that wish to use the intervention for 
their own private benefit.172 The following design will try to prevent the 
regulatory capture from the government investment, by structuring the 
Matchmaker funds as independent bodies with autonomous management 
(and private market incentives).173 
1. The “General Partner” 
Each participating federal agency will appoint independent private 
investment professionals to manage its Matchmaker fund. Reputable and 
established private equity managers (and staff) will be recruited from the 
private venture capital industry and will be granted competitive (compared 
to private industry) compensation schemes.174  
The track record of a venture capital fund manager is extremely 
important for several reasons. First, entrepreneurs prefer to work with fund 
managers who have a good track record of making successful deals and a 
lot of money in the past. These managers will stand a better chance of 
getting into the best deals in the future than managers with no experience in 
 
 
NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, WASH. POST Oct. 31, 2006, at A19; Joe Davidson, 
Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, at B03. 
172 See generally George Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971); see Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 
245 (1976); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 315 (“the theory of regulatory capture 
suggests that direct and indirect subsidies will be captured by groups that stand to gain substantial 
benefits and whose collective political activity is not too difficult to arrange”).  
173 BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 6 (2001), 
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/inqtel/inqtel80701rpt.pdf [hereinafter BENS REPORT]; see also IAN 
MACMILLAN ET AL., CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL: SEEKING INNOVATION AND STRATEGIC GROWTH 
(2008). In this study, the U.S. federal government pays attention to the rising role of corporate venture 
capital (CVC) in technology innovation. See also Connie K. N. Chang, Stephanie S. Shipp & Andrew J. 
Wang, The Advanced Technology Program: A Public-Private Partnership for Early Stage Technology 
Development, 4 VENTURE CAPITAL: AN INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 363 (2002) for an example 
(from 1990 to 2007) where the U.S. government attempts to act as a catalyst for innovation, by providing 
funding to research institutions; see also Maryann P. Feldman & Maryellen R. Kelley, Leveraging 
Research and Development: Assessing the Impact of the U.S. Advanced Technology Program, 20 SMALL 
BUS. ECON. 153, 163 (2003) (evaluating the successful results of the ATP program & the companies 
that received funding from ATP); In 2007, ATP was replaced by the Technology Innovation Program 
(TIP) Program; see generally, Technology Innovation Program, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/tip (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2018); see also America Competes Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, § 3012, 121 Stat. 572, 593 
(2007); see also Josh Lerner, When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective “Public 
Venture Capital” Programs, ECON. J., Feb. 2002, at F73, F80 [hereinafter Bureaucrats Meet 
Entrepreneurs]; see also Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital 
to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000).  
174 See Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs, supra note 173.  
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the industry. Additionally, managers with good records will typically have 
already built strong networks, so they can help their portfolio companies 
with introductions to potential customers and possible partners. Finally, the 
government agency must take into account the manager’s commitment as 
well as past experience with early-stage investment in entrepreneurial firms.   
The managers will act similarly to “general partners” (who invest in and 
manage the fund), whereas the government will act similarly to a “limited 
partner” (who is passive and only invests money).  
a) Compensation 
It is extremely important to make sure that the Matchmaker managers 
will be properly compensated for the fund to be successful and to prevent 
the situation of a revolving door (when a manager in a public position leaves 
for a higher paid private position). Therefore, based on the Israeli case study, 
and the Silicon Valley successful venture capital model, the managers will 
be compensated with a share of the profits generated by the fund.  The 
government will pay them an annual management fee of two percent and a 
carried interest of up to twenty percent of the profits of the fund (some 
private equity funds today pay even more than that to their management).175 
The mission of compensating managers of public funds in democracies 
can be particularly difficult, according to Lerner.176 For example, the story 
of the first government funded venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel, illustrates the 
hardships of modeling government funds after private equity funds.177  
In-Q-Tel was established in 1999178 in order to provide the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) with access to innovating technologies, by 
investing in emerging firms (small stake investments) and by using venture-
like processes.179 In order to encourage recruitment of established managers 
 
 
175 This incentive mechanism is very common in Silicon Valley and is called “2 and 20.” See, e.g., 
Laura Saunders, Billionaires Decry “Carried Interest,” WALL ST. J.: TOTAL RETURN (Jan. 20, 2012, 
4:05PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/01/20/billionaires-decry-carried-interest/; see also 
DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING: 
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3-5 (2009).   
176 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176.  
177 Id.  
178 During the time of its establishment, the idea of a government-funded venture capital firm was 
entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: The CIA's Tax-Funded Player in Silicon Valley, NPR (July 
16, 2012, 9:43AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-the-
cias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley (“Whether you have realized it or not, over the past 13 years In-
Q-Tel has changed your life. ‘Much of the touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things 
came out of various companies that In-Q-Tel identified,’ Smith says”); see also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN 
DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176 (“For many of the start-ups, which had targeted corporate customers, the 
challenges of breaking into government procurements were daunting”).  
179 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176 (In-Q-Tel also served as a bridge 
that was able to present new firms to the portfolio of the CIA and to underline the role of the government 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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and staff from the venture capital industry, and to prevent them from leaving 
to more lucrative private positions, the CIA offered a rewarding 
compensation scheme, which was very unusual compared to typical 
government jobs.180 The compensation included a flat salary, a bonus paid 
based on how well In-Q-Tel met government needs, and an employee 
investment program, which took a pre-specified portion of each employees 
salary and invested alongside the portfolio.181  After a few successful years, 
newspapers, like the New York Post,182 criticized this compensation model, 
accusing its managers of using taxpayers’ money for their own personal 
benefit,183 even though the model was successful and very acceptable in the 
private world.  
b) Incentives & Safeguards 
Despite potential criticism, this article recommends compensating the 
managers of the Matchmaker fund according to the private market, so that 
the managers will have incentives for the fund to grow. It is important to 
note further that there is an inherent risk for possible abuses by 
management, or conflicts of interest. Therefore, the following four 
important safeguards will need to be instituted. 
First, in order to hold the managers accountable to their investment 
decisions, they will be required to bring their own capital to the fund. The 
participating federal agency of each Matchmaker fund will determine the 
 
 
as a new customer for products developed that were by emerging growth firms); see also BENS REPORT, 
supra note 173 (“Unlike a true venture capital model, In-Q-Tel is more aptly described as a ‘technology 
accelerator,’ seeking speed and agility in discovering innovative IT solutions for the Agency. In-Q-Tel 
differs from private venture capital models in the following ways. In-Q-Tel: Places its value proposition 
on obtaining IT solutions, not foremost on return on equity or asset; Deals always result in a product or 
service (e.g. feasibility assessment, test product or prototype); Investments are more likely to provide 
value to the portfolio companies beyond cash: Investment is ”smart money” in its portfolio companies; 
that is, In-Q-Tel provides portfolio companies with intellectual capital, technology-related experience 
and the Agency as a potential test-bed; and Due diligence process is more strict: In-depth investigation 
into the company’s structure and financial status as well as the ability of the proposed technology to 
meet the Agency problem domain is completely evaluated before forming a contract”); see also Reinert, 
supra note 171, at 679.  
180 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176. 
181 For example, in 2012, its CEO, Christopher Darby, earned roughly $1 million. See Henn, supra 
note 178.   
182 Christopher Byron, Penny Stock Spies, N.Y. POST (April 25, 2005), 
http://www.rgmcom.com/articles/nypost17.html.  
183 Id. (These compensation arrangements, especially allowing the In-Q-Tel employees to invest 
alongside the portfolio investments, according to the New York Post, were “almost identical to the so-
called ‘Raptor’ partnerships through which top officials at Enron Corp were able to cash in personally 
on investment activities of the very company that employed them”); see also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN 
DREAMS, supra note 34, at 178.  
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amount of capital required as well as initiate a competitive bidding process 
for the fund manager positions.   
Second, in addition to bringing their own capital, the managers will be 
required to line up investments from other private investors and legitimate 
accountable sources. If a considerable share of the Matchmaker funds 
arrives from the private managers, then they are expected to concentrate on 
making sure that their investments thrive, as noted earlier by Lerner184 and 
the Israeli government’s example. Lerner described the reasons for the 
failure of the New York City Discovery Fund, which did not demand the 
fund’s managing groups to match any funds that were invested by the 
city.185  
Third, it is important to design the model so that the private sector 
partners only do well if the investments generate a good return.  
Fourth, the future investment goals must be clear and defined, and linked 
to the wider targets of the federal agency that launches this model.186  
c) Bidding Process 
The following are the ways in which the prospective Matchmaker fund 
managers can compete for the right to participate in the program. First, they 
will need to commit a certain maximum portion of capital that they will be 
willing to commit and contribute as private equity capital. Second, they will 
need to specify the size of the fund that they seek to establish. Third, there 
will be an evaluation of the managers’ reputation, previous achievements 
and previous dedication to small and medium enterprises and involvement 
with the other stakeholders. Fourth and finally, the federal agency will also 
consider factors relating to the fund’s long-term strategic investment 
objective, as well as the industries and research that they would like to 
promote.  
d) Matching Component and Another Incentive to the 
“Upside” 
 
 
184 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 138-40 (“[M]any examples can illustrate 
the real danger that the fund managers will have the wrong incentives. The Discovery Fund, for instance, 
was a $76 million fund organized by New York City in 1995, with funding entirely from the public 
sector and public utilities that focused on doing business in the city. The city hired a local venture group, 
Prospect Street Ventures, to run the fund, which was launched with a great deal of fanfare, including 
Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s pledge that it would generate 4,000 jobs. Yet the effort is generally regarded as 
a failure. . . .  It was natural to wonder whether the lack of demand for matching funds and the failure to 
set a mandate that matched city’s economic development needs intensified the problems that the fund 
encountered”).    
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 138.    
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The following suggestion is based on the successful incentive 
mechanism that was used by the Israeli government in the Yozma program. 
The creativity of Yozma was in the design of the risk-reward model. While 
the Israeli government collectively shared the risk with the foreign (and 
local) investors, it offered the investors the potential to reap all of the 
reward. In the same way, the federal government agency will share the risks 
associated with establishing the Matchmaker funds with the private actors, 
while also providing them with “incentives to the upside.”187  
The long-term goal of the federal government agency, in this initiative 
(unlike the In-Q-Tel example), is not to continue and remain an equity 
holder in the funds. Instead, the agency would present the private managers 
(general partners) with the option of inexpensively buying out its equity 
stake, in the event that the fund becomes profitable.188  The agency stake in 
the fund could be bought out once it had served its primary function (to 
attract professional venture capital investors to invest in early stage 
technology firms) rather than carry on indefinitely.   
The “upside” is that the private fund managers have a “call option,” for 
a period of five years, on the agency’s stake in fund. Therefore, in the event 
that the fund becomes profitable, the private managers can buy the agency’s 
stake at cost, plus a five to seven percent interest.189 For that reason, from 
the fund manager’s standpoint, it is an extremely good deal. 
The government agency will match a significant portion of the private 
management investment in the fund. In the Israeli Yozma example, the 
matching ratio was one to one, and the government only maintained a forty 
percent equity stake in the Yozma funds.  
This article supports the idea of private capital entities partaking in 
government investment because it will increase the total capital introduced 
into the market, and it gives the managers of the public-private fund 
incentives to do well.  
Additionally, the Matchmaker managers are encouraged in certain 
situations to invest in conjunction with other venture capital firms.  
 
 
 
 
187 See Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159 (discussing Yozma’s incentives to the 
“upside”). 
188 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 178 (discussing In-Q-Tel employees 
equity compensation).  
189 See Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142.  
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2. The Limited Partners 
a) The U.S. government agency 
There has to be a government agency that will be in charge of 
supervising, forming, as well as encouraging other agencies to take part in 
Matchmaker venture capital funds initiatives.  
It is highly recommended that there is a specific agency that will be 
tasked with supervising and managing this initiative.  There are several 
examples for the need to have a designated agency in charge of a 
government initiative to support entrepreneurial firms, and research and 
development.  One example is the successful SBIR program, which was in 
charge of mandating the eleven federal agencies (with extramural research 
budgets in excess of $100 million) to assign a certain percentage190 of their 
total extramural research and development budgets for grants or contracts 
to small businesses.191  
Another example is the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which is 
another successful public-private partnership example,192 of United States 
government providing funding to research institutions in order to encourage 
innovation. Moreover, in 2007, ATP was replaced by the Technology 
Innovation Program (TIP) Program, which “provides cost-shared funding to 
speed the development of high-risk, high-reward, transformative research. 
This research is targeted to key societal challenges that are not being 
addressed elsewhere.”193 TIP is part of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST).  
The agency will encourage other agencies to start their own or co-invest 
in Matchmaker funds. There already is an example of a successful public-
private venture capital fund. See In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital fund, 
which was discussed above.194  There are also other attempts and desires by 
 
 
190 For example, 2.8% of such budget in 2014.  
191 See WESSNER, supra note 79 (The SBIR program does not fund ‘Phase III’ innovations, which 
is a stage of development that is targeted under this initiative.  Instead, funding is targeted to the pre-
commercial stage of technology development); see also Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640. 
192 The ATP is an example of the US government acting as a catalyst for innovation, by providing 
funding to research institutions. See Feldman & Kelley, supra note 173, at 163 (evaluating the successful 
results of the ATP program and the companies that received funding from ATP). In 2007, ATP was 
replaced by the Technology Innovation Program (TIP) Program.  
193 TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION PROGRAM: TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S FUTURE THROUGH 
INNOVATION 1 (2009), http://www.nist.gov/tip/upload/tip_2009_annual_report.pdf (TIP defines a 
societal challenge as “a problem or issue confronted by society that when not addressed could negatively 
affect the overall function and quality of life of the Nation and as such justifies government attention.”); 
see also Reinert, supra note 171. 
194 However, it must be noted that the CIA enjoys a distinctive grant of discretionary power, which 
according to Reinert, was made by the Second Continental Congress to Ben Franklin & to the Committee 
of Secret Correspondence. See Reinert, supra note 171 (citing the CIA Act, which grants the CIA an 
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various government agencies, such as the United States Army and the 
United States Postal Service, to start their own public-private venture capital 
funds.195 Other agencies, like NASA, have also started their own venture 
capital firms (Red Planet Venture Capital firm).196 
 1.  Mission & Supervision 
This initiative is also built on the belief that the private managers will be 
subject to the oversight of the private market. The Matchmaker fund should 
nevertheless be reviewed annually by the government agency (limited 
partner) in order to determine the progress of the fund and whether 
additional funding is required. Another option is to appoint an outside firm 
that will review the Matchmaker fund on an annual basis.197 It should be 
noted that the funds require long-term strategic goals. In order to evaluate 
if the portfolio companies in the fund are meeting their expected rate of 
return, it is common to allow technology companies five years and 
biotechnology companies ten years.  Moreover, usually only about ten 
percent of the venture capital fund’s investment meet their projected rate of 
return, but they are supposed to make up for the rest of the portfolio 
companies that weren’t as successful.198   
The Matchmaker initiative will also serve as a vehicle that will take to 
the government agency privately developed innovative projects that can 
serve the agency’s needs. The Initiative establishes a channel for private 
firms to access government procurement and development, and for the 
government firm to be able to catch up with the market’s technological 
advancements.  
A major benefit of the Matchmaker fund to both parties is the 
introduction to continuous procurement opportunities between the 
government agency (that provides the funding) and the private technology 
companies that the fund will invest in. However, the fund should not be 
measured on whether the government agency was able to use the technology 
and improve its commercial needs. For that purpose, there should be another 
 
 
extensive authority to expend funds “for purposes necessary to carry out [the CIA’s] functions”); See 
Cent. Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, § 8(a), 68 Stat. 208, 212 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 403(j) (2006)).   
195 See Reinert, supra note 171, at 680.  
196 See id. For more information see NASA News Release, supra note 171. See also Kaufman, supra 
note 171. 
197 See Mark Muro, Economic Cluster Policy Begins to Work, BROOKINGS (July 9, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2013/07/09/economic-cluster-policy-begins-to-work/.  
198 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19 (“[O]nly about 10 percent of venture 
capital investments meet their expected rate of return”). 
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arm within the agency, which would be in charge of implementing these 
changes.199   
 2. User-friendly Application Process 
The Matchmaker initiative must have a user friendly and straightforward 
application process (based on the Yozma vs. Inbal example), without 
burdensome bureaucratic hurdles, reporting requirements and paperwork, 
which are frequently coupled with other governmental programs.  
b) Private Investors 
The Matchmaker management is encouraged to bring on additional 
sources of funding, including from private investors, who will also act as 
limited partners. This initiative is built on the belief that other private 
investors will be willing to trust the Matchmaker fund managers, and 
accordingly invest in the fund, because the managers will be subject to the 
oversight of the private market.  
II. STARTUP NATION’S YOZMA INITIATIVE 
In 1984, the Israeli government enacted the Law for the Encouragement 
of Industrial Research and Development (1984), which establishes the 
Office of the Chief Scientist (“OCS”), of the Ministry of Economy 
(formerly known as the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor).200 The 
Office of the Chief Scientist was established in order to supervise and 
 
 
199 This suggestion is given due to recent critics who maintain that part of In-Q-Tel’s responsibilities 
(and metrics for success) is to improve the agency’s technological advancement.  
200 See Hedva Ber, Is Venture Capital Special? – Empirical Evidence from a Government Initiated 
Venture Capital Market 8 (Samuel Neaman Institute: Science, Technology and the Economy, Working 
Paper STE-WP-9, 2002)  
[A] public committee had recommended various ways of encouraging venture capital in 
order to boost economic growth in general, and the high-tech industry in particular (Securities 
Authority, 1989). The committee stressed that government support for the VC industry should 
have two aims—to make it easier to obtain finance for VC investment, and to create the 
conditions for the development of a VC market, specializing primarily in managing investment 
and encouraging the participation of specialized financial entities. In this context, it was decided 
in 1991 to support the establishment of VC funds that would undertake and manage investments 
in R&D; this would be achieved by providing government guarantees for the purchase of shares 
in funds via the “Inbal” government insurance company. In this framework, three VC funds 
were founded in 1991–93, whose investments were guaranteed by the state. At the next stage, 
in 1992, at the initiative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the “Yozma” government 
VC fund was set up in order to establish VC funds in cooperation with private foreign investors, 
and was allocated equity of $ 100 million. Until its dissolution, the fund, which was set up for 
a limited period of seven years, supported the establishment of ten private VC management 
funds, which together had raised capital of $ 2.7 billion by 2000.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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execute the government’s policy for support of industrial research and 
development (“R&D”).201 The OCS’s main goals and incentives are to: (1) 
aid in the development of technology in Israel as a means of promoting 
economic progress; (2) increase the knowledge base of industry in Israel; 
(3) encourage entrepreneurship and technological innovation; (4) strengthen 
Israel’s scientific potential; and (5) fuel high value-added R&D and finally 
stimulate R&D partnerships both in the national and international 
communities.202  
Additionally, the OCS constantly develops and offers a variety of 
ongoing support programs that enable Israel to lead in high technology 
entrepreneurship, both in the national and international arenas, and 
collaborate in the cross-regional development and research efforts.203 Two 
of the main strategic development programs, established in 1991-1992, 
were the Technology Incubator program204 and the Yozma funds 
initiative.205 The Technology Incubator is outside the scope of this article 
and is discussed in a separate article.  
Economists Gil Avnimelech and Morris Teubal argue that Yozma (a 
government targeted program) and the emergence of a venture capital 
industry in Israel are distinctive examples that may possibly inspire future 
government design of a set of “infant industry” support programs.206 These 
examples, moreover, can play a significant role in distinguishing the 
guidelines for “evolutionary targeting,”207 and identifying the “required set 
 
 
201 See Israel Innovaion Center (formerly the Office of the Chief Scientist and MATIMOP), 
http://www.matimop.org.il/.  
202 Id. 
203 See id. (There are many programs, such as the following: the Heznek-Seed Fund (the government 
matches an investment in a seed company, and later on, when the company is successful, gives the 
investors the option of purchasing the government’s shares); the Tnufa Program (is intended to aid the 
entrepreneur in her preliminary endeavors to build a prototype, design a business plan, and register a 
patent); the Magneton and Noffar programs (are designed to encourage applied academic research in 
order to promote technology transfer to industry); and the Magnet Program (encourage formation of 
consortia that is comprised of academic institutions and individual firms in order to develop pre-
competitive technologies). See also R&D Funds, ISRAEL BUS. CONNECTION, 
http://www.israelbusiness.org.il/financialassistance/rdfound (last visited May 1, 2018).  
204 See Lesha R. Chaifetz, The Promised Land: An Examination of the Israeli High-Tech Industry, 
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 385, 389 (2002).  
205 Overview: Creating a Professionally Managed Venture Capital Market in Isreal, THE YOZMA 
GROUP (2000), http://www.yozma.com/overview/. 
206 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 154.   
207 Id. at 160:   
Evolutionary Targeting is one aspect of the application of the system-evolutionary 
perspective to ITP and to innovation-led and knowledge-based economic growth. Based on 
market-led development processes accompanied by policy-enhancements at critical points, it 
involves the design and implementation of targeted programs the objective of which is 
promoting the emergence of a multiagent structure. Evolutionary Targeting operates by 
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of pre-emergence conditions of industry emergence.”208 
A. The “Yozma” Funds Initiative 
In 1992, the Israeli government decided to intervene in the market and 
act as a venture capitalist.209 The Israeli government established a $100 
million fund, which was wholly owned by the public sector, called the 
Yozma Venture Capital Ltd.210 The main goals of the Yozma initiative were 
to create a platform in order to stimulate and encourage international 
venture capital investments in Israeli firms, as well as establish ten new 
venture capital funds in order to encourage future formations of local Israeli 
venture capital funds.211  
The Yozma program has the following three innovative fundamental 
characteristics. First, the Israeli government deliberately established 
privately owned (and managed) venture capital funds, which had a clear 
government component.212 The Yozma initiative is an example of a 
successful private-public-partnership model. Each of the ten original drop-
down funds participating in the Yozma program had to be represented by 
the following private and public partners. The public party was the Israeli 
government, and the private parties were Israeli venture capitalists in 
training, a foreign venture capital firm, and an Israeli investment company 
 
 
triggering and enhancing cumulative processes. The central idea behind the actual targeting is 
to leverage existing high quality (Class A) market forces for the purpose of building multiagent 
structures.  Evolutionary Targeting differs from the old “picking-winners” policy and from 
Korea’s post 1960s targeting (both of which are based on policy-led mechanisms), and from 
fully unprompted market-led processes.  It is based on a new, market- friendly and bottom–up 
view of targeting industries.  It operates by enhancing market-led variety and pre-selection 
through horizontal policies, and accelerating market-led selection and 
development/reproduction processes through coordination activities, targeted incentives, 
institutional changes, and other policies. Evolutionary Targeting involves a number of policies 
and policy actions related to multiagent structures: (1) promotion of pre-emergence conditions 
to generate policy targeting candidates (variation); (2) determination of relevant criteria for 
socially desirable multiagent structures and selection of those to be targeted; (3) identification 
of system and market failures blocking the unaided emergence of selected multiagent 
structures; (4) determination of targeted policy objectives, design, timing, and implementation 
oriented to triggering (or reinforcing) and sustaining cumulative emergence processes; and (5) 
termination of targeted support.  
208 Id. at 155. 
209 Id. at 157 n.5, 161 (“Yozma is a case of a successful targeted program, which followed 24 years 
horizontal grants to business sector R&D programs . . . . The motivation for this program was the need 
to solve a specific problem—the post R&D commercial failure of large numbers of Israeli startups during 
the second half of the 1980s”).   
210 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 156-57. 
211 See DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC 
MIRACLE 161 (Grand Central Publishing 2011).  
212 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159.   
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or a bank.213 
Second, the Israeli government required Israeli venture capital firms to 
partner with foreign venture capital firms.214 The Yozma initiative was able 
to attract foreign investors by using a relatively unique financial model 
whereby the Israeli government agreed to match funds to any foreign 
international venture capital fund (as well as local Israeli venture capitalist) 
that agreed to invest money in the partnership. The Israeli government 
would match a significant portion of the joint investment; however, the 
partnership would also have to include an Israeli investment group215 so that 
the Israelis could learn from the seasoned foreign venture capitalists. The 
Israeli government generally took a forty (40) percent equity stake in the 
newly established private-public partnership venture capital fund.216 
Third, the Israeli government shared the risk in establishing the funds 
with the private actors, as well as provided additional “incentives to the 
upside” to the private actors.217 It should be noted that the long-term goal of 
the Israeli government was not to continue and remain an equity holder in 
the private-public partnership venture capital funds. Instead, the 
government would present the private partners with the option of 
inexpensively buying out its equity stake, in the event that the fund was 
profitable.218  The ingenuity of the Yozma initiative was in the risk-reward 
model. While the Israeli government collectively shared the risk with the 
foreign (and local) investors, it offered the investors the potential to reap all 
of the reward.219 The Israeli government could be bought out once it had 
served its primary function (to attract foreign investment and start the fund, 
rather than carry on indefinitely). The “upside” was that in the event that the 
future venture capital funds became profitable, then the private investors 
would have a “call option” on the Israeli government’s shares. The call 
option was for a period of five years, at cost, plus a five to seven percent 
 
 
213 Additionally, the Israeli government designated one $20 million Yozma fund solely to directly 
invest in technology companies; see SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 156. 
214 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159.  
215 Id.  
216 “Yozma was the outcome of an interactive policy process that included the Treasury, the private 
sector, and foreign investors. The government participated in the formation of ten privately owned 
venture funds and contributed 40% of each fund’s capital. The focus was on seed and early stage 
investments in technology startups.” See TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT DARTMOUTH: CENTER FOR 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, NOTE ON PRIVATE EQUITY IN ISRAEL (last updated Aug. 2, 
2005), http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/uploads/centers/files/israel.pdf. 
217 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 162 n.12. 
218 Id.  
219 Id.  
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interest.220 Therefore, from an investor’s standpoint it was an extremely 
good deal.221  
B. The Need for Israeli Government Intervention in the Market    
The reasons to why the Israeli government decided to intervene in the 
market are different than the current conditions in the U.S. market. Prior to 
Yozma, there was only one venture fund active in the nation, Athena 
Venture Partners.222 During that period (around 1993), Israeli entrepreneurs 
had difficulty with getting venture capital financing.223 In order to get 
funding for their projects, Israeli entrepreneurs had to turn to the following 
limited avenues: apply to the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) for 
matching grants,224 apply for Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and 
Development (“BIRD”) foundation grants,225 use connections and personal 
 
 
220 Id. (According to Avnimelech and Teubal, Yozma “did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits; 
nor was it accompanied by new regulation rules for Pension Funds (Capital Gains tax was relatively low 
at the time and Pension Funds were allowed to invest a small amount on VC subject to Government 
regulation. In both respects Israel’s situation was ‘level playing field’ with that of other countries at the 
time)”). “Yozma did not simply provide supply, risk sharing incentives to investors-- as was common 
in other Government VC support programs (it did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits; nor was it 
accompanied by new regulation rules for Pension Funds18); its main incentive was in the ‘upside’ that 
is when VC investments where very profitable. Each Yozma fund had a call option on Government 
shares, at cost (plus 5-7% interest) and for a period of five (5) years.” Methodological Lessons, supra 
note 142, at 15. 
221 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 162. 
222 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.  
223 Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159-60:  
During pre-emergence (1985–1992) a number of critical dynamic sub-processes operated 
which led to ‘selection’ or ‘identification of focal points’ of the future high tech cluster.  Thus, 
through the activity of numerous market agents who undertook trial and error activities with 
respect to organization of VC and startup companies, and through government policy 
experimentation and learning, a consensus was arrived at as to the desirable characteristics of 
VC and startup companies—born global startups, which also focus on global capital and 
product markets; and LP VCs oriented to early phase finance and support of high tech startup 
(with an additional focus on software and communications technologies).  At some point during 
early emergence (1993–1995) this led to an accelerated entry of VC companies fed by a 
cumulative process with positive feedback. It is then that the industry attained a size, which 
enabled it to sustain a large number of supporting institution and services. The strong selection 
and reproduction processes that operated during the emergence led both to acceleration of 
activity and to the reconfiguration of the high tech cluster.” 
224 See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.   
225 See Encouragement for Industrial R&D in Israel, STATE OF ISRAEL MINISTRY OF INDUS. & 
TRADE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIST, http://www.donner-tech.com/israeli_r_d_law.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 
2018); see also What is BIRD, BIRD FOUNDATION, http://www.birdf.com/What-is-BIRD/ (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2017) (according to the BIRD Foundation’s statement, it “was established by the U.S. and 
Israeli governments in 1977 to generate mutually beneficial cooperation between the private sectors of 
the U.S. and Israeli high tech industries, including start-ups and established organizations.  BIRD 
provides both matchmaking services between U.S. and Israeli companies, as well as funding covering 
up to 50 percent of project development and product commercialization costs. . . . BIRD supports 
approximately 20 projects annually. The cumulative sales of products developed through BIRD projects 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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resources (the art of “bootstrapping”),226 or depend on bank debt 
financing,227 which was seldom granted to entrepreneurs with immature and 
uncertain ideas or projects.  
The problem that the Israeli government tried to solve was that, even 
though entrepreneurs were meeting their scientific objectives and working 
on promising technologies, they were unable to raise the funds to further 
develop and commercialize their products.228  
The other major objective for Yozma was to attract foreign venture 
capital funds to invest in Israeli firms.229 Venture capital investors 
traditionally invested in firms in close proximity to their geographic 
location. Therefore, the Israeli government needed to give foreign venture 
capital investors substantial incentives in order to buy into the Yozma 
program. It was not financing alone that the government wanted to 
encourage, but also the venture capital value added services that 
traditionally accompanied the investment, such as mentoring, networking, 
evaluation of business plans and commercial feasibility of the invention.230  
 
 
 
have exceeded $8 billion. Since its inception in 1977, BIRD has approved over 800 projects with leading 
companies in the U.S., for example: ADM, American Red Cross, Applied Materials, Avaya, Bayer 
Pharmaceutical, Becton Dickinson, Bio-Rad Laboratories, Eastman Kodak, General Dynamics, General 
Electric, Guidant, IBM, J&J, KLA- Tencor, Molex, Motorola, Procter & Gamble, SanDisk, Spansion, 
Telcordia, Texas Instruments, Tyco and others”); see SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211 (“[Y]et 74% of 
high-tech exports out of Israel were generated by just 4% of high-tech companies”).  
226 See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.    
227 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 156. 
228 Id.; see also Gil Avnimelech, A Five-phase Entrepreneurial Oriented Innovation and Technology 
Policy Profile: The Israeli Experience, 16 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 81, 88 (2008) (“[P]olicy-makers believed 
that the way to overcome these deficiencies was to foster a domestic VC industry, which then became a 
strategic priority. The outcome was two VC-directed programmes - Inbal (since 1991), which failed; 
and Yozma (implemented during 1993–1997), which was very successful and was credited with 
triggering the creation of the domestic VC industry. The critical design dimensions of the Yozma 
programme dealt with the specific system failures blocking the VC emergence in Israel”) (citations 
omitted).  
229 See also id. at 91-92 (“During Israel’s VC industry pre-emergence phase (1985–1992), a 
considerable amount of business experiments took place; which facilitated identification of the basic 
design features of the future VC targeted programme. These experiments pertained to start-up and VC 
companies and activities.  There was learning about a new start-up business model, which is oriented 
from “day-one” to global product and capital markets with strong implications for its strategy.  For 
example, it became increasingly important and recognized that start-ups must from year one search for 
linkages with the leading high-tech clusters and markets. Moreover, it became increasingly important to 
adopt US security and exchange commission standards and accountancy rules and other attire of US 
high-tech companies.  Some of the start-ups were successful and pointed the way to others. Business 
experiments and learning also occurred in relation to VC companies and activities”) (citation omitted).  
230 Id.  
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C. Inbal (Israeli Government Intervention that Failed) led to Yozma 
Israeli policy makers came up with the Yozma model, following 
experimentation and an extensive lengthy preparation, which involved the 
search for the possible causes for the problem of the weak “economic impact 
of companies having received R&D subsidies from the OCS.”231 According 
to economist Avnimelech, Israeli policy makers tried to learn from the 
successful story of Silicon Valley. Accordingly, many OCS officers visited 
Silicon Valley, conducted interviews with various US stakeholder groups, 
such as venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, officers of the small business 
administration, and with investment banks.232  
The first Israeli government targeted attempt at creating a venture capital 
industry, which was via the implementation of the Inbal program, was 
actually unsuccessful. The Inbal (government insurance company) program, 
which was launched in 1991, prior to Yozma, was an effort by the Israeli 
government to stimulate publicly traded venture capital funds by essentially 
“guaranteeing the downside of their investments.”233 The Israeli 
government (via Inbal) guaranteed up to seventy percent of the initial capital 
assets of the four Inbal venture capital funds that were traded on the Israeli 
stock market.234 Moreover, the managers of the Inbal funds had to deal with 
certain restrictions on their investments, as well as with government 
bureaucracy and preparation of lengthy and cumbersome periodic reports.235 
The Inbal venture capital funds and the program were not successful.236 
Israeli policy makers were able to draw the following conclusions due to 
the failure of Inbal, which led to the development of Yozma.237 They needed 
 
 
231 Id. at 12 (“The high impact of these search and learning processes was underpinned by the 
successful development of experience-based policy capabilities at the OCS—the result of over 20 years 
of operational experience in managing incentive programmes in support of R&D and innovation”).   
232 Id. (“The high impact of these search and learning processes was underpinned by the successful 
development of experience-based policy capabilities at the OCS—the result of over 20 years of 
operational experience in managing incentive programmes in support of R&D and innovation”).   
233 Id.   
234 See Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evolutionary Innovation and High Tech Policy: What Can 
We Learn from Israel's Targeting of Venture Capital 8 (Samuel Neaman Institute: Science, Technology 
and the Economy Program, Working Paper STE-WP-25, 2005) [hereinafter Targeting VC] (“Inbal 
(1991) - a Government owned Insurance company, which gave partial (70%) guarantees to traded VC 
funds. Four VC companies were established under Inbal regulations. This early VC support program 
failed to create a VC industry”). 
235 Id.; see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.  
236 Targeting VC, supra note 234; see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.  
237 See Gil Avnimelech, VC Policy: Yozma Program 15-Years perspective, (Presented at the DRUID 
Conference, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758195 [hereinafter Yozma Program] (“Four sets of 
factors seem to have been responsible for Yozma to become an effective trigger of Israel’s ICT Cluster: 
a) favorable background conditions; b) policy and market forces’ experimentation during the pre-
emergence period; c) timing - the time overlap between Yozma implementation on the one hand and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
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to develop a mechanism that would draw the participation of professional 
venture capital agents in the Yozma program, in order to produce venture 
capital funds that could provide Silicon Valley-like added services, such as 
mentoring, networking, and evaluations of business plans.238 They decided 
to select the limited partnership form (instead of publicly traded funds), for 
the formation of the venture capital funds, and put emphasis on early stage 
investment. According to economists Avnimelech and Teubal, another 
reason for selecting the limited partnership model for Yozma had to do with 
the experiences with the Inbal publicly traded venture capital funds that 
were “exposed to ‘stock market sickness’ & short-term thinking,”239 which 
resulted in very low “social impact.”240  
The Inbal program had several weaknesses that Yozma was able to deal 
with.  First, investors in publicly traded venture capital funds had difficulty 
with contributing to the operation of the fund.241  Second, publicly funded 
venture capital funds (as compared to private ones) encountered more 
difficulty with swiftly exploiting the reputation that is usually earned from 
early exits, and, therefore, with raising new capital.242 Third, Inbal’s failure 
was also due to the limits that it placed on the funds’ management 
compensation as well as their decision-making ability.243 Finally, Inbal was 
lacking in incentives for the “upside” and therefore did not attract 
professional venture capitalists.244  
The Yozma fund was accordingly designed in 1992 to overcome the 
abovementioned challenges, and especially to create a platform for a 
competitive venture capital industry in Israel.245 The Yozma program was 
intended to create venture capital funds, which will be active and invest a 
critical mass of capital in the Israeli market, while also collaborating with 
(as well as learning from) foreign limited partners, and growing a network 
of international contacts and connections.246 
 
 
 
rising Nasdaq index and expanding market for ICT on the other; and d) the successful design and 
implementation of the Yozma program”).  
238 Id. at 15 n.9. 
239 Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14. 
240 Id.   
241 Id.   
242 Id.   
243 Id.  
244 Id. 
245 See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 6-7.  
246 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:267 
 
 
 
 
D. The Successful Yozma Design 
The results of the Yozma initiative exceeded expectations and are 
noteworthy.  Yozma I was created in 1993 and in the following three years 
established ten drop-down funds.247 The initial Israeli government owned 
Yozma I venture capital fund was established a $100M investment, as 
follows: $80M of the investment was directed at the ten drop-down funds, 
whereas the remaining $20M was to be invested directly in Israeli high-tech 
companies.248 The ten initial Yozma I funds, which were created between 
the years 1992 to 1997, raised just over $200 Million with the funding 
support of the Israeli government.249 
The following is a description of the structure of the ten drop-down 
Yozma funds.   One of the requirements for the establishment of the Yozma 
funds was that each of the resulting funds would have to assign at least two 
limited partners, one from an established Israeli financial institution and the 
other from an established foreign institution. It should be noted that the new 
entity, the venture capital fund, had to be an autonomous new organization, 
which was not owned by any of the existing financial institutions.250  
The “upside” incentive that Yozma provided to private investors was 
that they could leverage their profits through acquisition of government 
shares, because each of the ten Yozma funds had a call option on 
Government shares, at cost (plus interest), for a period of five years.251 The 
Yozma I fund and ten drop-down funds were autonomous and independent 
Israeli venture capital limited partnerships.252 They also had an emphasis on 
early-stage investment in Israeli high-technology companies. Each of the 
ten Yozma Israeli venture capital funds was managed by a local Israeli 
 
 
247 See YOZMA GROUP, supra note 205 (According to Yozma’s web-site, “[w]ith the backing of 
prominent American, European and Israeli investors, Yozma successfully launched its second fund, 
Yozma II, which commenced operations in September 1998 and its third fund, Yozma III in 2002. 
Yozma II & III continued the successful strategy of making direct investments in technology companies 
and to play a significant role as a value added investor by recruiting senior managers, formulating 
business strategies, raising additional capital rounds and attracting strategic and financial investors to its 
portfolio companies”). 
248 See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 7 (“The basic thrust was to promote the establishment 
of domestic LP VC funds that invested in very young Israeli high tech startups with the support of 
government and with the involvement of reputable foreign VC investors”). 
249 See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.  
250 See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 7 (“[T]“his was made to assure a competitive industry, 
which is not lacked-in to the old financial system’s routine). When a fund fulfilled these conditions, the 
Government would invest (through Yozma) 40% (up to 8M$) of the funds raised.  Thus the $100M of 
Government funds would draw at least $150M of private sector funds (domestic and foreign)”). 
251 See id. “The incentives to the ‘upside’ also stimulated entry of professional VC firms and 
managers (when you have higher returns the government incentive becomes more significant). The 
program also assured the realization of learning through the compulsory participation of foreign financial 
institutions (most of them were well-experienced foreign VC companies”  
252 Id. at 8.  
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management team, which partners with an established Israeli financial 
institution and a reputable foreign venture capitalist.253  
The ten original Yozma funds were managing Israeli funds totaling $2.9 
billion. One decade following their inception, the Israeli venture market has 
also expanded to sixty additional funds, which were managing 
approximately $10 billion.254 According to Dan Senor and Saul Singer, the 
“magnitude of this success shows that the ratio of VC investment to GDP is 
far higher in Israel than elsewhere.”255 
Another feature that set the Yozma initiative apart from other Israeli 
government programs at that time was that it eliminated many of the 
bureaucratic hurdles. It was all about simplicity, employing a user-friendly 
governmental application system and a simple reporting mechanism. There 
were no cumbersome application processes or complex reporting 
requirements.256  
Moreover, Yozma not only “imitated” the Silicon Valley success story, 
it also adopted US venture capital friendly legal structures that would attract 
foreign investors, which was key to its success.257 There are examples of 
foreign government programs, such as in Malaysia, which were designed to 
 
 
253 Id.  
254 See YOZMA GROUP, supra note 205 (Yozma also “helped a significant number of its portfolio 
companies go public on major stock exchanges in the US and Europe. In addition, the group was 
instrumental in placing its portfolio companies for an investment or acquisition by leading corporations 
such as America On Line, Cisco, Computer Associates, ECI Telecom, General Instruments, Johnson & 
Johnson, Medtronic, Microsoft, Sequoia Capital and Benchmark”). 
255 BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 157.  
256 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 183; see also Yozma Program, supra 
note 237, at 5, 8 (Avnimelech is comparing between Yozma and Inbal, and describing the bureaucracy 
that Inbal fund managers had to deal with).  
257 See Ber, supra note 200, at 15: 
The structure of the funds’ activity in Israel is almost identical with that in the US.  The Israeli 
funds were set up for a limited period of seven years (as compared with ten years in the US), at 
the end of which they are liquidated (although the management funds may continue 
functioning). During this period they invest in firms in order to bring them to a stage where 
they can realize their investment (henceforth, exit). In other words, the activity of the funds—
from the time the firms are selected and throughout the stage of investment in them—is 
undertaken for one purpose. Because the lifetime of each fund is limited, the management fund 
tends to open a new one every three years. The funds are set up as limited partnerships so that 
the capitalists (limited partners) are not involved in the current activity of the fund, and just 
receive periodic statements. The payment to the managers of the VC funds is usually divided 
into two: current annual payment as a percentage of the fund’s capital (which in Israel is 2–2.5 
percent), and a percentage of the yield on successful investments (20–25 percent), which is 
usually received only after the initial capital has been repaid to the capitalists (i.e., not at the 
first exit). 
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encourage entrepreneurship but failed258 because they tried to simply 
“import” a design from another country without changing the legal or tax 
structures, ultimately wasting taxpayers’ money. Some of the Yozma fund’s 
legal features included: (1) a fixed life of ten (or seven) years, (2) a limited 
partnership, modeled after Delaware partnership law, which was the 
standard practice in the United States, and (3) a flow through tax status.259 
The payment to the venture capital funds managers were also modeled after 
the Silicon Valley “2 and 20” rule, and were typically divided as follows: 
annual payment as a percentage of the fund’s capital (2–2.5 %), and a 
percentage of the yield on successful investments (20–25 %), which is 
obtained only after the initial capital was repaid to the investors 
(capitalists).260 Had the government not adopted these new legislation 
features and the Israeli treasury department resisted them, it is unlikely that 
the program would have become successful.261  
E. Yozma vs. Silicon Valley 
The emergence of the Israeli high-tech industry in the 1990s is very 
similar to that of Silicon Valley.262 Both Israel and Silicon Valley emerged 
from multi-faceted collaborations between academic and research 
institutions, private local firms and public intervention (such as grants and 
continued military spending in technology). However, according to 
Avnimelech and Teubal, Silicon Valley didn’t have a background 
“backbone” program that parallels the Israeli government’s implementation 
of its horizontal R&D grants scheme.263 There are US government programs 
that support R&D and small entrepreneurial firms, such as the SBIR,264 
which was discussed above and was a federal government initiative that 
changed the United States innovation system during the 1980s. SBIR, for 
example, was not a targeted policy, such as Yozma, because it was not 
 
 
258 See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 111 (“The frequent failures among 
public programs to stimulate entrepreneurship and venture capital suggest that many pitfalls face these 
efforts. The stark truth is that many more initiatives have been unsuccessful than successful”). 
259 See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 157. 
260 See Ber, supra note 200, at 15. 
261 See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 166-170. 
262 Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Venture Capital Policy in Israel: A Comparative Analysis & 
Lessons for Other Countries 1-55 (Presented at the International Conference: Financial Systems, 
Corporate Investment in Innovation and Venture Capital, Brussels, 2002) [hereinafter Comparative 
Analysis]. 
263 Id.  
264 Id. at 37; see also Venture Capitalist, supra note 144, at 285-86 (SBIR “has provided over $7 
billion to small high-technology firms between 1983 and 1997 [and] awardees enjoyed substantially 
greater employment and sales growth than the matching firms”).  
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designed to create a venture capital industry.265  
Avnimelech and Teubal compared Yozma to other international 
(including US) government programs that supported the venture capital 
industry, such as programs that provide supply and risk sharing incentives 
to investors.266 There are several unique features of Yozma. First, its main 
incentive - the “upside” – if the future venture capital funds became 
profitable, then the private investors had a “call option” on the Israeli 
government’s shares. The call option was for a period of five years, at cost, 
plus a five to seven percent interest.267 Second, Yozma guaranteed a 
“learning from others” process (or a realization of “supply side learning,”) 
because it mandated the participation of a foreign financial institution.268 
Third, the Yozma funds were structured to allow informal interaction 
amongst the different managers of the funds.269 Fourth, there was active 
participation of the government, the Office of the Chief Scientist) (The 
Chief Scientist was the founder of Yozma - Yigal Erlich), and the other OCS 
officers at the board meetings of all the Yozma funds.270 Fifth, there was an 
aggressive investment policy and steady stimulation of co-investment 
between the Yozma Funds.271 Sixth, on the “demand side,” the support for 
the industry was provided by other Israeli government “backbone” R&D 
support programs as well as by the Technological Incubators Programs,272 
discussed below.  
V. CAN THE NEW INITIATIVE FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERVENTION IN 
THE MARKET IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OWNED ENTERPRISES 
PREVENT ABUSE? 
There are many who oppose the idea of an interventionalist government.  
Moreover, there are several arguments that criticize government owned 
enterprises, like the ones suggested in this Article (i.e., the Matchmaker), 
 
 
265 See Comparative Analysis, supra note 262, at 6 (noting there were other general policies that had 
an effect on venture capital formation in the US, such as the reduction in capital gains tax, but they are 
not targeted policies). 
266 Id. at 19. Yozma “did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits; nor was it accompanied by new 
regulation rules for Pension Funds.” Id.; see also id. at 20 n.20 (“Capital Gains tax was relatively low at 
the time and Pension Funds were allowed to invest a small amount on VC subject to Government 
regulation. In both respects Israel's situation was ‘level playing field’ with that of other countries at the 
time”).  
267 Id. at 20. 
268 See Comparative Analysis, supra note 262, at 20. 
269 Id. 
270 Id.  
271 See id.  
272 Id. 
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due to their inefficiency and even wastefulness. The following are some of 
these arguments.  
A. The problem of Inadequate Monitoring of Public 
Management 
There are several theories that deal with the problem of inadequate 
monitoring of public managers, in this case, the managers of the 
Matchmaker model. Agency theory deals with the shirking behavior of 
agents.273 The government as a stakeholder in the Coalition model must deal 
with the uncertainty surrounding the actual innovation development, 274 on 
top of the potential opportunistic conducts of the managers.275  
Managers of the Matchmaker must deal with information risks – the 
“adverse selection” challenge276 – prior to any engagement with or 
investment in a startup or idea.  The managers will be in charge of acquiring 
information about the potential portfolio companies, ideas, technology and 
processes. They will also be required to select the appropriate venture or 
idea based on the information provided and make sure that the venture is 
not investing in “lemons.” 
Property rights theory also discusses the problem of inadequate 
monitoring of managers. In the model, the monitoring issue can arise as a 
result of the government ownership stake, and the fact that the government’s 
stake is not traded in the open market. Therefore, it excludes the 
transferability of the ownership.277  
Finally, public managers have to deal with challenges of complying with 
formal decision-making procedures and bureaucracy that are associated 
with getting government funding or grants.278  
 
Answer 
First, according to Michael Jensen and William Meckling, agency 
problem is a common problem and exists in all enterprises and cooperation 
 
 
273 See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74, 75 (1979). 
274 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.  
275 See also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 127-31; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 54-
55.  
276 Akerlof, supra note 148, at 493; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 56 n.21; see also GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 148, at 129.  
277 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge and 
Organizational Structure, in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 103 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998). 
278 See Fillipo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering Conventional 
Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 821, 827 (2014). 
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forms.279 Therefore, it is not a unique characteristic of a public or quasi-
public enterprise. 
The analysis of the Agency theory assumes that the main problem is to 
align the interests of the principal and agent, and to get the agent to follow 
the principal’s orders, without taking into account the agent’s interests. 
Perhaps it would be wise to also take into account the agent and its interests, 
in order to make sure that the principal will keep its end of the bargain. The 
initiative addresses this concern, as discussed in this article below.  
Second, it is possible that the fact that the shares of the Matchmaker are 
not easily transferrable, can cause poor monitoring of the management 
because it provides ownership stability and hence not enough incentives for 
management to work hard and maximize profit.280 However, it is also 
possible that ownership instability can weaken and decrease managements’ 
incentive to innovate.281 
There is empirical evidence that suggests that active markets actually 
have a negative effect on innovative investment strategies, as follows. While 
a firm is not listed on the market, management is in reality more inclined to 
invest in innovating research because it has more tolerance towards 
failures,282 mainly because outside investors cannot observe (or closely) 
monitor the rate of project advancements.283 Managers may abstain from 
investing in risky innovation if they are under a constant threat of loosing 
 
 
279 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) 
The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” 
welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts— at every 
level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in 
governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as 
agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. 
The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these 
situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born 
will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social 
sciences generally.  
280 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 828.  
281 See id.  
282 See Daniel Ferreira et al., Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private, REV. 
OF FIN. STUD., Jan. 2014, at 256, 256 (“We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing 
ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas.  This result derives from the fact that private 
firms are less transparent to outside investors than are public firms.  In private firms, insiders can time 
the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news.  This option makes insiders more 
tolerant of failures and thus more inclined to invest in innovative projects. In contrast, the prices of 
publicly traded securities react quickly to good news, providing insiders with incentives to choose 
conventional projects and cash in early”); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 827 (“By contrast, publicly 
traded securities require disclosure of all the relevant information and their market prices quickly react 
to business successes and failures, thereby encouraging insiders to choose conventional projects”).  
283 See Ferreira et al., supra note 282, at 266; see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 827.  
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their jobs and of a change in both ownership and management.284 
As noted in this article, the information asymmetry problems are even 
more complex in the Matchmaker examples, as compared to other public 
enterprise initiatives, due to the fact that the managerial decision-making in 
high-technology requires more knowledge than the general managerial 
skills.285 The startup manager is required to apply, verify and understand the 
technical information necessary for the managerial decision-making 
process.286 That is one of the reasons why this article strongly suggests that 
the managers appointed will have the requisite professional private sector 
experience, know-how and involvement. It should be noted that 
professional venture capital funds also face and are able to overcome the 
same information asymmetry issues.287  
Moreover, security markets are often inefficient.288 In the event that 
public managers’ performance is measured by the securities market, 
managers might increase their emphasis on short-term profits, which will, 
in turn, sacrifice long-term innovative investment strategies because they 
would like to avoid being replaced.289  
Third, government owned firms can (and are advised to) reduce the 
amount of bureaucratic decision- making processes. See the examples of In-
Q-Tel case study above.  
 
 
 
 
 
284 Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-56 (A. Auerbach ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).  
285 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 277, at 12 (Jensen and Meckling established that agency 
problems due to conflicts between investors and managers can have an effect on the interest of both 
equity and debt holders to supply capital and invest (“[i]t is generally impossible for the principal or the 
agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.  
In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs 
(non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and those decisions, which would maximize the welfare of the principal”)). For further 
discussion on agency problems and strategies to reduce them, see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann 
& Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 2009).  
286 See also Utset, supra note 148, at 57; see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 127-31 
(discussing the information asymmetry issue and other risks that venture capitalists face while dealing 
with start-ups).  
287 According to a report by U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, only ten percent of VCs manage to get a 
return on their investment. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19. 
288 See Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure and 
Securities Regulations, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 650 (1995).  
289 Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62 (1988).  
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B. Lack of Market Discipline of Government-Owned Firms 
There is a long debate in economic literature on the relationship between 
innovation production and market competition.290 The argument against 
implementation of this initiative is that there is no market discipline on 
government owned firms because of the “soft budget constraint 
problem.”291 As a result of the soft budget constraint problem, managers of 
the proposed Matchmaker initiative will not be concerned with the portfolio 
firm’s financial conditions and will subsequently undertake reckless 
strategies.292  
 
Answer 
As for the issue of the unrestricted budget, a hard budget constraint can 
be imposed in practice.293 Furthermore, Fillipo Belloc notes that in order to 
encourage innovation, there is a need to center on long-term investment and 
strategy. Therefore “an excessive short-term attention to cash flows” might 
actually discourage innovation.294  Moreover, according to Phillipe Aghion 
et al., the incentives of management to innovate might in reality increase if 
they are “insulated” from penalties for failure of the portfolio innovative 
 
 
290 Phillipe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 701, 701 (2005); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 829. 
291 See J. Kornai, Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
801, 806 (1979) (The budget constraint of a firm is soft if the government helps the firm out of trouble 
- i.e. the government covers firm’s losses - through subsidies, tax exemption, credit granted at soft 
conditions, etc.); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 829.   
292 See id.; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q. J. ECON.  
995, 997 (1994) (analyzing political influence on firms); see also MARY SHIRELY & AHMED GALAL, 
BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP, WORLD 
BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT 10 (1995) (“[M]any governments did not reward managers who 
attained contract targets; where bonuses or other rewards were offered, soft targets frequently 
undermined their impact … politicians carefully weigh any change in state enterprise policies, preferring 
those that benefit their constituents and help them remain in power”) (This argument has been largely 
used to support privatization initiatives as a commitment device of the government to harden the budget 
constraint of firms); see Klaus M. Schmidt, The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete 
Contracts Approach, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1996). Schmidt argues that “different allocations of 
ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect 
both allocative and productive efficiency. Privatization is seen as a commitment device of the 
government to credibly threaten to cut back subsidies if costs are high in order to give managers better 
cost-saving incentives (a ‘harder budget constraint’). The cost of privatization is that allocative 
efficiency is distorted.” 
293 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 830 (“[T]o the best of my knowledge, the causal relationship 
between soft budget constraints and the output of innovation has not been investigated”); see also 
Kornai, supra note 291, at 807.  
294 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 834-35. 
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projects.295  
C. Illegal Behavior and Corruption of Public Managers 
Public managers’ actions can have serious effects on economic 
activity.296 There are many examples of public manager’s misbehavior, such 
as rent-seeking, corruption or other illegal activities, that can not only 
hamper the manager’s decision-making process, but may also reduce the 
incentives and opportunities to invest in innovation.297 It should be noted 
that the illegal behavior might also result from various conflicts of interest 
of public managers.298  
 
Answer 
It is true that managers in general, whether public or private, can behave 
illegally for various reasons. Additionally, public managers can also be 
involved in situations of conflict of interest, “but it is difficult to say a priori 
whether this happens to a greater (or lower) extent than for private 
managers,” according to Belloc.299 Managers of private firms also have their 
fair share of conflicts of interest with other stakeholders, for example, due 
to their investment in securities or derivatives of other firms.300  
In the Coalition Model, the managers are dealing with industrial sectors 
 
 
295 Phillipe Aghion et al., Innovation and Institutional Ownership, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 278 
(2013).  
296 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 830.   
297 There are many examples of causes to possible corruption of public managers, such as ones 
resulting from pressures of interest groups, lobbies, or even individual persons influence. See id.; see 
also, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 599 (1993) (Shleifer and 
Vishny introduce “two propositions about corruption.  First, the structure of government institutions and 
of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak 
governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels.  Second, the 
illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its 
sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is 
so high and so costly to development”). 
298 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 831.   
299 Id.  
300 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1255, 1256 (2008) (“[G]reater shareholder power should be coupled with greater shareholder 
responsibility… the rules of fiduciary duty traditionally applied to officers and directors and, more 
rarely, to controlling shareholders, should be applied to activist minority investors as well”); see also 
Belloc, supra note 278, at 831 (There are many forms of self-dealing by corporate insiders in private 
corporations, including appropriation of corporate opportunities, excessive compensation, self-serving 
financial transactions and outright theft of corporate assets); see also Simeon Djankov et al., The Law 
and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 430 (2008) (“[T]hose who control a corporation, 
whether they are managers, controlling shareholders, or both, can use their power to divert corporate 
wealth to themselves, without sharing it with the other investors. Various forms of such self- dealing 
include executive perquisites to excessive compensation, transfer pricing, taking of corporate 
opportunities, self-serving financial transactions such as directed equity issuance or personal loans to 
insiders, and outright theft of corporate assets”) (internal citations omitted).  
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and hence with business objectives that are similar to those of private 
managers in the market.   Therefore, their behavior can be analogous to their 
private manager counterparts.301   
D. Political Capture of Business Objectives 
The main argument for the privatization of government owned firms has 
been the political capture of business purposes and objectives.302 There are 
several examples of politicians who control government (particularly state) 
owned firms. Politicians, who would like to make their constituencies 
happy, are concerned with job creation.   Therefore, they have a tendency 
to push for more recruitment than necessary in order to create jobs and spend 
more (in excess) than the private market would on an initiative.303  
Moreover, politicians can also push for initiatives, projects and corporations 
that will essentially be tools to transfer wealth to their supporters, partners 
or relatives.304 These examples can seriously hamper the innovation process 
and diminish the productive process.305 Moreover, governments can elect to 
pay higher wages to government workers (higher than are customary in the 
 
 
301 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832; see Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons, 
69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3 (1991) (discussing the group of ideas known as ‘new public management’ (NPM), 
as well as their criticism) (NMP is a movement that encourages public administrations and non-profit 
firms to implement pay-for-performance programs); see also Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz, Can 
Private Learn from Public Governance?, 115 ECON. J. 377, 377 (2005) (According to Frey and Benz, 
“in view of recent corporate scandals, private governance can learn from public governance: (1) Goal-
oriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection 
process of employees; (2) Extrinsic, but non-monetary incentives (e.g. conferring orders and titles) can 
be used; (3) The power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power, appropriate rules of 
succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms.” Frey and Benz further criticize the 
current private sector management compensation that “has often increased still more, even though share 
prices have plummeted. This suggests that, in actual fact, the compensation of managers has little to do 
with performance. Rather, the reason for the steady increase in compensation is now widely seen in the 
fact that managers are able to exert considerable control over how much money they get. Some managers 
even resorted to unlawfully misrepresenting their firms accounts in order to raise their private incomes. 
A particularly troubling aspect is that, in many instances, extended pay-for-performance plans have 
created the very incentives to commit fraud, by making it attractive to produce short-term increases in 
share prices”) (internal citations omitted). Id. at 378.  
302 See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 133,142, 
148 (arguing the “importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate”;  and that 
“state firms are inefficient not just because their managers have weak incentives to reduce costs, but 
because inefficiency is the result of the government's deliberate policy to transfer resources to 
supporters”).  
303 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832.   
304 See id.  
305 See Shleifer, supra note 302, at 141 (arguing that “[g]overnments throughout the world have 
long directed benefits to their political supporters, whether in the form of jobs at above-market wages or 
outright transfers”).  
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private market), which will surpass the productivity levels.306  
 
Answer 
It is true that one of the main concerns of any government led initiative 
is the fear of political abuse. As discussed in the proposed model, in terms 
of governance, autonomous Matchmaker VC organizations must be formed, 
and the management must be independent in order to set goals, supervise, 
and most of all limit the dangers of political pressures and abuse.307 
Additionally, according to Belloc, there are actions, such as increasing 
wages and employment or settling production plants in depressed areas, 
which government can take that do not lessen the social welfare but correct 
market failures or internalize negative externalities.308  
Moreover, Belloc discusses the fact that the uncertainty of re-election 
gives politicians an incentive to behave.309 There are several factors that can 
contribute to the citizens’ ability to hold politicians accountable for abuse 
of power,310 such as free press,311 political framework,312 and participation 
rights.313 Therefore, to prevent a public manager from misbehaving, 
appropriate incentives must be put in place, as well as institutional and 
economic systems.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
At a time when the American economy continues to try to ramp up and 
recover economically, the proposed Coalition Model is intended to pave the 
way for policymakers to consider and institute new initiatives that can 
encourage innovation, drive growth, create new entrepreneurial firms and 
increase the overall productivity, profitability and sustainability of 
American businesses. 
 It is based on the economic growth theory offered by Solow.314 Solow 
postulated that technological innovation is the only reliable engine that can 
drive change and is the fundamental source of sustained productivity and 
growth.  
 
 
306 Giacomo Corneo & Rafael Rob, Working in Public and Private Firms, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1335, 
1338 (2003).  
307 See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.  
308 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832. 
309 See id. at 833 (Belloc argues that politicians react to incentives, such as economic and non-
economic, and cultural, like any other individual does). 
310 Id.  
311 Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 
1801, 1801 (2003). 
312 See Belloc, supra note 278, at 833. 
313 See id. 
314 Solow, supra note 13.  
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The Coalition Model builds on Solow’s postulations by adding the 
following: first, the government needs to invest in knowledge, human 
capital and innovation in order to encourage knowledge spillovers.315 
Second, there is a need to encourage the formation and survival of new 
entrepreneurial firms, because they are predominantly innovative and 
stimulate growth.316 Third, the United States Government has an important 
role in developing growth in the market.317 This article calls for the 
government to take part in the proposed public-private partnerships and to 
take into account strategic planning that can benefit society for future 
generations.   
Operationally, these concepts are configured through the Coalition 
model’s Matchmaker (government investment in start-ups) Initiatives. The 
Matchmaker is a private-public equity investment fund that will function to 
invest in early stage firms, while also addressing the commercial strategic 
development needs articulated by the funding governmental agency. It also 
establishes a channel for private firms to access government procurement 
and development. This initiative will function as autonomous body, and is 
designed to prevent political capture.  
This Coalition Model, based on emerging variations in Israel and Silicon 
Valley, is proving to be successful in addressing economic growth and 
sustainability in America. 
This article also joins the call for a return to a basic “managerialism” 
philosophy.318 Managers of public corporations nowadays cannot 
realistically pursue long-term projects, such as R&D, because such projects 
cannot generate immediate financial returns to their shareholders. 
Therefore, this model calls for management to take into account the interests 
of all stakeholders.  
While this Model tries to address a number of solutions to grow the 
economy and encourage innovation, it has limitations. The one-model fits 
all format for the various regions, states, and government agencies can run 
into problems given geopolitical realities at the local, state, federal and 
international levels which can confound these relations at any given level. 
Also, legal scholars will be challenged in the future in terms of rewriting 
 
 
315 David B. Audretsch, Entrepreneurship: A Survey of the Literature 5 (Enterprise Directorate-
General, European Commission, Enterprise Papers No. 14, 2003) (“Entrepreneurship has become the 
engine of economic and social development throughout the world. The role of entrepreneurship has 
changed dramatically between the traditional and new economies”).  
316 BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at ch. 1. 
317 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25, at 57. 
318 See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of 
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1181-82 (2013). 
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and reinterpreting intellectual property and antitrust laws, but that is not 
within the scope of this Article. 
Using the Coalition Model and its variants should, as seen from 
encouraging preliminary results, develop into a new high bar standard for 
helping to expand strategic and sustained economic growth, innovation and 
development for generations to come. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5
